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ABSTRACT  
   
The utopian impulse represents hope for another world; a reflection of the injustices 
inherent to the hegemonic order that are understood as natural, necessary, desirable, and 
unchangeable. Those who challenge this orthodoxy are heretical utopians; pioneers of the 
counterintuitive who explore the types of relations that rather than reproduce the 
dominant order, shatter it, and manifest new ones based upon principles of justice.   This 
project explores how ideological mechanisms of control embedded within the hegemonic 
fascist imaginary landscape of the United States render the visions of emancipatory social 
movements, that challenge dominant ways of knowing and being, as the "merely utopian" 
so as to instrumentalize the behavior of civil-society towards the maintenance of the 
established social order and the suppression of alternatives (Gordon 2004).  In a rapidly 
changing world reeling under the pressures of late-stage capitalism, it is essential for 
those who value social and political justice to incessantly cultivate the cultural imaginary 
so as to shift the boundaries of what types of social relations are possible, feasible, and 
desirable through the process of struggle in heretical spaces. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I wanted to give you a good story, for one thing, because when you mention 
utopia, most people, even those sympathetic to hearing the word spoken, 
immediately want a very practical example or evidence or explanation–a story–
that will make them believe you are not just wasting their time with impossible 
fantasies, faraway lands with seas of lemonade, unrealistic futures, or worse, 
tyrannical delusions and evil social experiments.  (Gordon 2004, p.113). 
 
This passage from Avery Gordon’s Keeping Good Time illustrates an important 
point; “utopia has a bad reputation.”  Throughout history, renderings of utopian projects 
have called forth visions of justice that shatter time and possibility, placing human 
consciousness in unfamiliar spaces that challenge what they had previously understood as 
truth.  When someone speaks of truth, they are always describing the limits of their 
capacity to explore the world further and in turn, are revealing the underlying structures 
of their imaginations that are difficult, maybe even impossible, to transmute.  Cultural 
significations that are congruent with the way one imagines the world are understood as 
possible, but those that have traveled beyond the limits of these assumptions, are 
unconventional, dangerous, and utopian.  In this way, these imaginaries are 
schizophrenic, in that their capacity to distinguish between that which is real and that 
which is imagined is blurred by the dominant understanding of what is possible.  Where 
the utopian is always unfamiliar, “we almost always know that we are struggling over the 
truth when we confront it, and that such a struggle is inextricably bound up with the 
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question, not simply of what is real or realistic, but with the question of what is possible, 
what could be” (Gordon 2004, p.121).   
It is impossible to discuss “what if” and “what could be,” without bringing up 
hope. Hope is a glimmer of possibility that drives people to behave in the present so as to 
arrange its trajectory towards a specific outcome in the future; the more unlikely the 
chances of succeeding, the more potent the sense of hope must be in order to compel 
agency in the present.  In this way, while the experience of hope always begins with a 
delighted fantasy of the future, but actually functions as a form of perpetual torment that 
one can’t help but subject themselves to.  This anxiety is rooted in the desire for a 
particular outcome, one that does not appear to be entirely in a someone’s control, which 
will determine the nature of their experience in the future according to how they imagine 
it.   
A person experiences hope only after they establish a specific position with regard 
to how they desire the future to unfold; an expression born of one’s desire to dictate the 
aftermath of the unforeseeable future that will inevitably result from the incessant conflict 
between countless, often hidden, forces and wills unfolding across time and space.  In 
this way, it is a moment of cognitive dissonance when one experiences the simultaneous 
acceptance and rejection of free will, while attempting to subconsciously determine 
whether some combination of desperation, honor, stubbornness, bravery, stupidity, and 
devotion is enough to make them believe that something is possible despite what reason 
says will most likely occur.   
Even though a person can most definitely experience hope under circumstances 
where their victory is all but guaranteed, it is almost always more powerful and dynamic 
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when it is experienced by those who assume themselves to be less powerful or equal to 
their opponent; like a steadfast warrior who maintains the will to fight, in spite of facing a 
clear disadvantage on the field of battle.  This is because a person with little 
accountability to the outcome of a conflict, who will maintain great power regardless of 
how it unfolds, carries less hope for his army’s victory than those people he wishes to 
enslave and anyone who could potentially lose their life in the process.  In this way, hope 
is much more useful during times of crisis when a person or group is trying overcome 
some sense of powerlessness.   
Hope compels us to work towards accomplishing something that is understood to 
be entirely possible and imperative to accomplish, even at great cost and despite likely 
failure.  It is for this reason that hope is the most useful to the stubborn, the naive, and the 
oppressed, but also the self-determinant, the compassionate, and the discontent.  In trying 
times it reminds people of who they are, who they want to be, what they believe in, and 
that sometimes it is worth it to pursue an objective regardless of the fact that it appears to 
lie beyond their immediate grasp; to shape a future which is guaranteed to blossom into 
either freedom or tragedy, but most likely the latter.  In this way, hope is both 
disempowering and overwhelmingly authorizing; effectively placing freedom before fear 
and humanity before reason.  Without it, no one would have agency in anything in which 
they were not sure that they could win easily.  It is the irrational drive towards fulfilling 
meanings that challenge what one’s other faculties are telling a person can or probably 
will occur; to negate the hypocrisy of perpetual surrender, and to move forward despite 
staggering adversity.  
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When hope and possibility are constrained by the imagination, it creates a 
formidable barrier to social justice because there is rarely agency in crisis without any 
hope for success and never where even concrete successes are dismissed as too good to 
be true; like a child who continues to fear the monster in their closet, even after their 
guardian shows them it is empty.  Without the capacity to change one’s assumptions 
about the world due to their innate fears, which render the possibility of another world as 
mere wishful thinking, a person remains subject to the tyranny of the way they imagine 
the present; one with no prospects for a better future. 
It is the role of what Erik Olin Wright (2010, p.10) refers to as emancipatory 
social science, which “seeks to generate scientific knowledge relevant to the collective 
project of challenging various forms of human oppression” to address this this problem of 
hopelessness.  Where the first step is to  “identify existing social institutions and social 
structures systematically impose harms on people,” the second is to “develop a coherent, 
credible theory of the alternative to existing institutions and social structures that would 
eliminate, or at least significantly mitigate, the harms and injustices identified in the 
diagnosis and critique” (Wright 2010, p.10).  The final step is to engage in social 
transformation and consciously contribute to the process of social reproduction.   
I will deploy Wright’s methodology to address three key questions:  First, if 
utopian thinking is impractical and inevitably leads to disaster, why do we need it?  
Second, what is the nature of hopelessness?  Finally, how do we address this sense of 
hopelessness that limits the possibility of building another world based on principles of 
justice so that we can begin to explore alternative ways of knowing and being on the path 
towards self-determination?   
  1   
CHAPTER 1 
JUSTICE AND UTOPIA 
What is Utopia and why is it dangerous? 
 
The Greek etymology of the word utopia is a combination of “good place” and 
“no place,” which is appropriate when you consider that when it comes to delivering 
justice in the material world, utopias have a bad reputation (Gordon 2004).  Ever since 
the word was coined by Thomas More in the year 1516 (2004), utopia has been a concept 
of great controversy.  It invokes fears of totalitarianism and visions of impracticality in 
the minds of the dogmatic and rational, while simultaneously offering hope that another 
world is possible to anyone willing to indulge themselves in trying to imagine what 
freedom feels like.   
Despite the fact that utopian thinking appears to have offered humanity only 
misfortune in the past when used as a guide towards erecting a perfect society, without it, 
we are lost in a time and place where unjust relationships are conflated with the 
conditions of an objective social reality; where “the given is a prison” (Gordon 2004 
p.116).  Utopian visions are emancipatory and for this reason are often invoked when a 
person realizes the discontinuity between the world they want to live in and the one in 
which they must live.  These visions, which contradict the given truths about reality as we 
understand it, compel us to question our ways of knowing and being.  When a person 
takes a utopian vision seriously, it transforms them: 
He’s beginning to realize that if he recognizes no other society except the 
one around him, he can never be anything more than a parasite on that 
society.  And no mentally healthy man wants to be a parasite: he wants to feel he 
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has some function, something to contribute to the world, something that world 
make the world poorer if he weren’t in it.  But as soon as that notion dawns in the 
mind, the world we live in and the world we want to live in become different 
worlds.  One is around us, the other is a vision inside our minds, born and fostered 
by the imagination, yet real enough for us to try to make the world we see 
conform to its shape.  This second world is the world we want to live in, but the 
word “want” is now appealing to something impersonal and selfish in us. (Frye 
1964, p.151) 
 
 These utopian visions occur when the conditions of one’s material reality does 
not meet their needs or desires, and alternatives to this world manifest themselves as 
fantasies, or “collages of experience” that are “made up of bits and pieces of the here and 
now” (Jameson 2005, p.xii).  Because utopian visions are constructed from experiences 
and perspectives, they are also limited by them.  As a result, a person’s attempts to adjust 
all of the factors in the imagined world that would be affected by their conscious 
modifications to it, are futile because the human consciousness is not complicated enough 
to comprehend the infinitely complex material reality where nothing operates completely 
independently of anything else real or imagined.  Reality is a set of unimaginably 
complex relationships that we do not have the capacity to fully understand, account for, 
or replicate unless formed according to the conditions presented by a specific time and 
space. 
Visionaries who generate, carry, and share utopian creations often oblige others to 
imagine these worlds in paintings, film, poetry, music, architecture, and various types of 
literature, but the ideas that are represented through these various mediums are often 
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political in nature.  While the visions can be harmless pleasures, they tend challenge 
taken for granted universal assumptions about human sociality that can directly affect 
political-economic reality because of the way that the way humans behave and the way 
they imagine the world can hardly be separated.  Because the ideals on which these 
visions are extended can be linked to any abstract concept, if implemented in reality with 
no regard for the limitations or inconsistencies of the ideals, they are often impractical 
and dangerous in terms of the types of political relationships they manifest.   
The early “utopian socialists” engineered predetermined, models for a perfect 
society, such as the worlds imagined in Thomas More’s classic Utopia (2004), William 
Godwin’s Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on Morals and 
Happiness (1793), and the various works of Charles Fourier including The Theory of 
Four Movements (1808), based upon what they understood as the universal requirements 
and desires of humanity. These are examples of what Martin Buber (1996, p.11) has 
labeled “schematic fictions,” where we see “a kind of abstract imagination, which starting 
from the nature of man, his capacities and needs, deduces a social order that shall employ 
all his capacities and needs.”  Here, the visionary begins from a single ideological 
abstraction and then expands upon it in order to create a world that is unrestricted by the 
conditions of social and material reality.   
Often these predetermined models are condemned as totalitarian by their critics 
who argue that “self-determination, even in an emancipated society, could not be static: It 
cannot be the endlessly repeated determination of ‘we who choose to remain the same; 
or, even if that decision were taken each day, self-determination would require that it 
should at least be at issue each day.  If autonomous space does not constantly move 
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beyond itself, then it becomes a prison, a holding in check of the push towards creation” 
(Holloway 2010, p.209).  In sum, the inability of these types of utopian visionaries to 
account for difference among its claimants and the limitations of material reality, 
alongside the inability to adapt to changes over time make them unrealizable, or at least 
unsustainable as functional societies.  
In 1855, the Vegetarian Kansas Emigration Company founded what was referred 
to as Octagon city with the intent on building a predetermined, vegetarian, community 
that abstained from meat, tobacco, tea, and coffee and other “stimulants” (Fitzgerald 
1988, p.130-133).  It was a colony of 108 people that were able to acquire around 32,000 
acres in Northeastern Kansas through homesteading provisions of the time and around 
$75,000 in startup capital.  When the settlers were told that living accommodations were 
available and that everything required for agricultural production was almost complete in 
1856, they left their homes in the east, but were sorely disappointed when they arrived 
and found that hardly any infrastructure had been built.  A number of settlers fled and 
several died in the first summer when they faced powerful storms and a harsh drought, 
which caused crops to fail and creeks and wells to dry up.  The utopian project was a 
complete failure for the incapacity of its claimants to account for both their limited skills 
(only one third were practical farmers, while the other had technical training) and for 
their inability to adapt to the harsh ecology.   
Projects like octagon city serve as an example of why pre-planned utopian 
projects are dangerous; because their claimants make universal assumptions that are 
inconsistent with a specific time and space and the people that inhabit it.  It is for this 
reason among others that Anarchist thinkers such as Mikhail Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin, 
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and Emma Goldman were simultaneously inspired by and weary of the inherent fallacies 
of the early utopian socialists and in turn, broke away from the line of thought that sought 
to establish perfected, enclosed, predetermined models to pursue instead, alternative “pre-
revolutionary” strategies based on “organic planning” where the “dominant purpose is to 
inaugurate from an impartial and undogmatic understanding of contemporary man and 
his condition, a transformation of both, so as to overcome the contradictions which make 
up the essence of our social order” (Buber 1996, p.10-11).  Rather than attempting to 
build a new, perfect, static society from their assumption as the utopian socialists did, 
they attempt to address specific challenges and tools presented by the material conditions 
arising from the ascent of industrial capitalism in order to.  In other words, the utopian 
visions of these thinkers reflected their conditions; where they saw the subjugation of 
man to religion, capitalism, and the state as unjust, they advocated for their abolition 
through direct action politics as the path to a more just society.  
While the ideas of the “utopian socialists” managed to influence politics in many 
parts of the world to varying degrees, they were simultaneously revered as visionaries 
and critiqued as naïve dreamers by “post-revolutionary” utopians or adherents of 
“scientific socialism” such as Karl Marx and Frederic Engels (Buber 1996, p.10)(Marx 
and Engels 1972).  Engels attributed the limitations of the early utopian socialists such as 
Fourier, Godwin, and Saint Simon to the fact that they were forced “to construct the 
elements of a new society out of their heads because these elements…” those of capital 
“…had not yet become generally visible in the old society” (Buber 1996, p.3).   
Whereas many utopian socialists were attempting to manifest utopian visions as a 
strategy for revolution, for Marx and Engels utopia can only after the revolution, when 
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the state has “withered away” and produced conditions for the “dictatorship of the 
proletariat” (Marx and Engels 1972).  In turn, Marx and Engels denounced their “utopian 
competition as lacking any conception of agency or political strategy, and characterized 
utopianism as an idealism deeply and structurally averse to the political as such” 
(Jameson 2005, p.xi).  In other words, while pre-revolutionary thinkers like Bakunin 
(1970, p.vi)  “refused to recognize the existence of any preconceived or preordained laws 
of history...” but rather asserted “that men shape their own destinies, that their lives 
cannot be squeezed into a Procrustean bed of abstract sociological formulas,” Marx and 
Engels argued in the Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels 1972) that the 
transformation of social relationships towards an inevitable utopia, communism, was the 
result of conflict between social groups and will only take place according to the gradual 
unfolding of objective historical conditions, outlined in Marx’s dialectical historical 
materialist methodology.  From this perspective, any attempt to enact a utopian society 
outside of this model will fail because the material conditions, such as the 
industrialization of society and the collective ownership of the means of production, have 
not yet occurred, meaning the material conditions are not yet ripe for communism.  More 
than that, any attempts at building a classless and stateless society outside of this model 
under current material conditions will actually be detrimental to social change because 
they will take away resources and momentum from movements acting in accordance with 
the historical materialist model.   
Because Marx’s method was understood as objective truth and relegates justice to 
future according to the dialectical historical materialist model, the Anarchists calling for 
direct action in the present were understood as idealists whose strategies for social 
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transformation were inconsistent with the conditions of material reality (Marx and Engels 
1972).  In turn, post-revolutionary utopians contended that social transformation can only 
take place by first centralizing power in the state, which can be utilized to organize labor 
and abolish private property, leading to the initiation of the socialist stage of history as 
the precursor to communism.  Communism is the society at “the end of history” in 
Marx’s model, where the state becomes unnecessary to coerce society’s behavior and 
“withers away” (Buber 1996, p.101)(Marx and Engels, 1972).  Vladamir Lenin 
understood this model as scientific truth, which negates strategies that are not consistent 
with that truth such as attempting to build utopian worlds in the present; “in Marx, you 
will find no trace of Utopianism in the sense of inventing the ‘new’ society and 
constructing it out of fantasies” (Buber 1996, p.99).  Ironically, those who have managed 
to centralize power in the state through various methods while attempting to negate the 
capitalist stage of history have resulted in failure, including Lenin himself.   
By organizing a revolutionary vanguard party, the Bolsheviks, Lenin created a 
totalitarian statist society maintained through a highly organized system of 
“authoritarianism and bureaucracy” based on “his belief that no social order at all could 
exist without top-down control, which meant the hegemony of the proletariat over all 
other social classes, and the hegemony of various professional cadres over the 
proletariat” (Day 2005, p.61).  Such a perspective perpetuates the idea that civil-society is 
completely ignorant of its own interests and is incapable of organizing itself without the 
presence of rigid hierarchies.  As a result, self-determination and the recognition of 
human difference are castoff as “merely utopian” (Gordon 2004).   
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The deterministic orientation towards utopian possibilities that is presented by 
Marx and Engels describes a system operating almost independently of the agency of its 
claimants.  A legacy that is carried on, but adjusted in contemporary Marxist thought.  
For example, in Utopistics: Or Historical Choices in the Twenty-First Century (1998),  
Emmanuel Wallerstein, the creator of world systems theory argues that “when systems 
are functioning normally, structural determinism outweighs individual and group free 
will.  But in times of crisis and transition, the free will factor . . . [is] at its maximum, 
meaning that individual and collective action can have a greater impact on the future 
structuring of the world than such action can have in ‘normal’ times” (Wallerstein 1998, 
p.1).   
For Wallerstein, the “free will factor” represents “the capacity for rational thought 
and action in circumstances where the outcome of such thought and action is not 
predictable, but sensitive to intervention” (Gordon 2004, p.118).  Avery Gordon 
explicitly rejects Wallerstein’s deterministic line of thought, asserting that his “free will 
factor has little instinct for freedom” because “its instincts and impulses are always 
contained by a system which dominates so thoroughly that it decides when we can “have 
an impact” on restructuring the world, which is always relegated to the future” and there 
are “no guarantees” of success (Gordon 2004, p.119, 131),  In other words, Gordon 
recognizes how Wallerstein’s understanding of the way human agency relates to justice is 
directly linked to the parameters laid out by the system he seeks to transform, which takes 
place at the cost “of the freedom and autonomy that utopian thinking cannot and does not, 
in practice, do without” (Gordon 2004, p.119).   
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If a framework for justice always relegates the prospect of a better world to the 
future, it anaesthetizes the “instinct for freedom,“ which occurs where the environment of 
an organism which is no longer capable of adapting to the competitive performances 
required for well-being under domination, is no longer capable of tolerating the 
aggressiveness, brutality, and ugliness of the established way of life,” and effective 
utopian thought demands its presence at all times and especially in times where the “free 
will factor” is not in effect (Gordon 2004, p.124-125).  For this reason and many others it 
is in the interest of those concerned with the current condition of social and political 
injustice to attempt to cultivate the instinctual basis for freedom in those around us: 
Cultivating an instinctual basis for freedom is about identifying the longings that 
already exist--however muted or marginal or extreme--and turning these longings 
into vital needs, into things that we cannot and will no longer live without... 
…Cultivating an instinctual basis for freedom is about being obstinate that 
survival is a condition which does not exist when it is obtained at the expense of 
the suffering of others or of oneself. Cultivating an instinctual basis for freedom is 
about cultivating an individual and collective indifference to all the promises of 
happiness, worth, and freedom that deliver their opposites or morally degraded 
versions of themselves… …Cultivating an instinctual basis for freedom is about 
the "ingression of the future into the present.” Cultivating an instinctual basis for 
freedom, then, is the delicate and difficult process of making the qualitative 
difference possible and realistic, a part of who we are as a people and thus 
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accepted as reality instead of rejected as the merely utopian. (Gordon 2004, 
p.125) 
If the utopian is always relegated to the future, it is impotent as a framework 
for justice. In fact, the most valuable aspect of utopian thinking as an emancipatory 
framework is that it “doesn’t wait for authorization from a superior system or higher 
power to direct our fate.  From this standpoint, we authorize ourselves a 
monumental act of freedom in the authoritarian world in which we live” (Gordon, 
2004, p.126).  It is only after we give ourselves permission to be free in the present, 
will we ever be able to be. 
As Gordon points out, the way a person imagines their role in political-
economic reality, which shapes what they understand as possible, does not operate 
independently of the order in which they have come find themselves subject 
(Gordon, 2004).  For this reason, the way one envisions utopia, established 
according to the taken for granted universal truths that structure our imaginations, 
can function as a tool of domination; a fantasy that compels us to think and behave 
in a certain way to achieve this fantasy, despite the presence of contradictory 
material conditions that could be better served by alternative ideologies, but are 
effectually subverted.   
In Raven (2008), Tim Reither tells the story of how a radical Christian 
community organizer by the name of Jim Jones convinced almost 1000 people to 
break contact with their family 1970’s to build a new community in Guyana, Africa 
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where he ruled as the supreme spiritual leader.  The People’s Temple was a utopian 
fantasy rooted in the ideal of serving a God, and in turn followers were coerced, 
either through psychological manipulation or threats of violence, to work long 
hours under difficult conditions in the hope of realizing a perfect society.  However, 
what appeared to be a dream was actually a nightmare as the world slowly began 
to realize that Jones was exploiting his followers; bending their will towards his 
own twisted means, including sexual assault and the funneling of his followers 
money towards his pharmaceutical drug addiction.   
Many supporters remained oblivious to what was occurring in the People’s 
Temple even in the end, when fearing the consequences of an impending raid by 
federal authorities, Jones convinced his followers to commit “revolutionary 
suicide” in order to attain eternal life in heaven.  The 913 victims (including 200 
children) that resulted from the assault serve as a warning to how the imposition of 
a utopian vision upon others through violence or manipulation is a recipe for 
dystopia (Raven 2008, p.267).  It is important to point out that the tragedy was not 
just the result of direct violence, but the belief in a universal, superior, dogma that 
took priority over all others that may have averted the tragedy.  Those who simply 
went along with Jones’ plans to commit suicide as well as the followers who carried 
out violence on those who did not, behaved in such a way because of the ideal on 
which their devotion to the utopian vision was based; serving God.  A God whose 
requirents could only be appeased through submission to his prophet. 
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The tragedy of Jonestown is a useful example for illustrating how invoking divine 
righteousness serves as a powerful tool of domination because it functions as a universal 
ideological framework based on assumptions rooted in an authority that lies beyond 
material reality, making it difficult to contest those who claim to be in direct contact with 
it.  In other words, belief in the concept of God enables “prophets” to establish a power 
relationship with their followers because once they manage to convince others of their 
divinity, their leadership becomes incontrovertible and their punishment for disobedience 
is relegated beyond the limits of the mortal body to a castigation of eternal suffering in 
hell: 
Christianity is precisely the religion par excellence, because it exhibits and 
manifests, to the fullest extent, the very nature and essence of every religious 
system, which is the impoverishment, enslavement, and annihilation of humanity 
for the benefit of divinity.  God being everything, the real world and man are 
nothing.  God being truth, justice, goodness, beauty power, and life, man is 
falsehood, iniquity, evil, ugliness, impotence, and death.  God being master, man 
is the slave.  Incapable of finding justice, truth, and eternal life by his own effort, 
he can attain them only through a divine revelation. (Bakunin 1970, p.24) 
 
Bakunin’s (1970) words offer insight into how operating from a perspective that 
assumes a predetermined, fixed, metaphysical reality reproduces an ideological 
framework that automatically places the authority of church above any other that could 
possibly exist on earth because the cost of failure runs far beyond the limits of material 
reality.  Religion creates a shared imaginary that contains masterfully designed 
ideological mechanisms of control that all but guarantee its preservation and in turn, the 
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legitimacy of authority.  The ultimate mechanism of control being when a religious 
authority convinces his followers of the necessity of their personal role in their path to 
salvation; the idea that without access to the authority’s alleged capacity to interact with 
the divine, they are forsaken by God and will be subject to eternal punishment and 
torture.  God is powerful, indeed.   
Religion operates as an ideology, which Louis Althusser (1971, p.162) describes 
as a “representation” of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions 
of existence” that “occludes or misdirects our understanding of the world.”  In other 
words, “ideologies offer, ultimately, a means to train or organize the imagination,” 
producing a static framework that shapes one’s behavior and what a person is capable of 
understanding as possible (Haiven 2014, p.230).  In the case of Christianity, the ideology 
produces an imagining of the world is split into the spiritual and the profane, where the 
fate of one’s eternal soul is at stake according to their level of subjection to the “truths” 
passed on through texts and religious leaders.   
Arguably, the most effective of these “truths” in Christianity is the belief in “free 
will,” which is necessary to make its followers believe as if the individual is entirely 
responsible for their behaviors, beliefs, and conditions and therefore is personally 
accountable to a higher authority.  Nietzsche (1990, p.64) argued that “an account of will 
is an account of becoming accountable, of becoming guilty; “the doctrine of will has been 
invented essentially for the purpose of punishment, that is, of finding guilty” (as cited in 
Ahmed, 2014, p.7).    This emphasis on the individual will combines with other 
mechanisms of control in the imagination, such as the fact that Satan is supposed to tempt 
and deceive humans, effectively threatening its claimants with eternal damnation for the 
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crime of exploring other ways of knowing and being in the world.  In turn, those 
operating from this framework attempt to impose it upon others for their own well-being 
and even the worst atrocities are forgiven and understood as a necessary means to an ends 
because the imaginary state of the soul is privileged over the condition of the living, 
conscious, will of human beings. 
While the tragedy at Jonestown in 1973 was born of acting on utopian visions 
rooted in Christian ideology, they do not have to be metaphysical in order to constrain 
possibility, but rather, they can be rooted in anything from the aesthetic, to the rational, to 
the absurd, which are very difficult to distinguish.  For example, in Seeing Like a State 
(1998), James C. Scott explores how utilizing the logic of “high-modernist ideology” as a 
framework for large-scale utopian social engineering projects in the twentieth-century has 
inevitably led to tragedy and failure in every context where it was deployed.  He defines 
this way of organizing the imagination, or ideology, as a “supreme confidence about 
continued linear progress, the development of scientific and technical knowledge, the 
expansion of production, the rational design of social order, the growing satisfaction of 
human needs, and, not least, an increasing control over nature (including human nature) 
commensurate with scientific understanding of natural laws” (Scott 1995, p.89).   
Similar to belief in the divine, the imaginary framework that comprises a high 
modernist perspective contains ideological mechanisms of control that cause it to be 
understood by its claimants as universally superior to alternatives and in turn, compels 
them to dismiss anything inconsistent with their way of knowing and being as valid or 
relevant.  The fact that it is understood as coming from an objective or scientific position, 
one that has always been about the domination of man and nature, its claimants view 
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themselves as justified and obligated to impose it upon others for their own good, despite 
its practical limitations.   
The failures that result from high-modernist ideology are very much linked to the 
fact that it places rational aestheticism before functionality, creating within the resulting 
system, inconsistencies between the ideal and material reality that result from ignoring 
complex relationships.  Scott illustrates this concept as applied to utopian visions by 
offering us the example of Vladimir Lenin’s attempts to impose a universal mechanized 
system of “scientific” agricultural production rooted in high modernist ideology and upon 
the Russian peasantry (Scott 1998).  These villagers had been developing their traditional 
“backwards” methods over time through experimentation for millennia and they had 
proved themselves effective as a result of being adapted by the people who lived there 
and had allowed them to live comfortably and sustainably in a specific locality in the 
absence of domination.   
Like the Christians in Jonestown who heeded the authority of God (or an insane 
person wielding a machine gun who heeds it), Lenin and other high modernists assumed 
that only experts wielding scientific knowledge are worthy of leadership and secondly, 
that everyone else must either obey their logic or be removed.  By centralizing power and 
authority in the hands of a revolutionary vanguard party, Lenin was able to impose this 
project upon others, believing that it was his obligation according to “scientific 
socialism” to act as a guide for the people who were too ignorant to guide themselves.  
When in reality, the peasants instinct for freedom was leading them in a much different 
direction, but their movement was blocked (Gordon 2004). 
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When a utopian vision is imposed upon others, as was the case with the 
collectivization of the peasantry (Scott 1998), it creates several problems that contribute 
to its inevitable failure.  First of all, it does not successfully account for both the immense 
heterogeneity of culture and ecological specificity across time and space.  When 
universal ways of knowing and being that privilege certain groups over others are 
introduced into foreign spaces, indigenous ways of knowing and being are dismantled 
and forgotten to make room for the universal ones that cannot take into account the 
knowledges that local people have developed through thousands of years of adaptation 
and experimentation in that ecology.  Unfortunately, when those memories are no longer 
allowed to be practiced or they are no longer relevant1, eventually they will cease to be 
passed on.  When this occurs, local people lose the capacity to live autonomously and 
become subject to the primary authority of the system that has been imposed on them.  
Also, a person who becomes forced to live in another person or group’s utopian vision 
against their will is never utopian, but always dystopian.  Once traditional ways of 
knowing and being are forgotten, the unwilling subjects inevitably come to serve the 
needs of the authority that maintains the system that has been imposed upon them 
because they come to lack the knowledge and skills to live otherwise as well as the means 
to lead an explicit resistance, a process that is hard to separate from slavery. 
In order for a utopian vision to circumvent failure in material reality, there are 
three primary criteria it must avoid.  The first, as Gordon (2004) pointed out, is that for a 
utopia to be useful it must trigger one’s instinct for freedom in the present and never be 
                                                 
1 Perhaps, what is necessary to survive changes or they were forced to relocate from their indigenous space, 
where their knowledges had no place.  It is like forcing a native New York City cab driver into the Amazon 
rain forest and expecting them to thrive. 
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relegated it to a future that may or may not occur.  Second, it must not be based on a 
fixed ideological system, such as Christianity or high-modernism as per the examples, 
because the moment one believes that they have discovered universal truth, “he can only 
corrupt himself by privilege and corrupt others by power” (Bakunin 1970, p.7).  Third, a 
utopian vision must never be imposed upon its subjects or it will lead to dystopian 
authoritarianism and tragedy. When a utopian vision is imposed upon others, it fails to 
account for difference for both its capacity to destroy all that is necessary to maintain 
autonomy outside of that vision and its failure to account for cultural and ecological 
difference across time and space. 
Now that the dangerous aspects of utopian thinking have been identified, they can 
be dissected from the type of utopian framework that is useful for imagining the 
possibilities of social and political justice.  I will begin this process by examining what 
remains of utopia after the procedure, that now allows us to leave universality, 
imposition, anxiety for a future utopia behind so I can move towards developing a 
utopian framework that permits human difference and freedom in the here and now.  
Once this is accomplished, I will be able to explore how the structuring of the 
imagination determines who is included in a person or group’s sense of justice and in 
turn, whether their visions for a better world are that of a utopia or dystopia. 
 
Utopia as Heresy 
 
Utopian thinking has always had a bad reputation (Gordon 2004), but like many 
things with bad reputations, this attitude is rooted in generalized assumptions that were 
founded not by those who would be served by such perspectives, but rather by those who 
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have a stake in maintaining the reputation of the rigid system of social order perpetuated 
by them (Mannheim, 1936).  For the purposes of this essay, the social order, can be 
understood as a system or method of organizing political-economic relations between 
humans and their environment that reproduces itself through methods of control rooted in 
authority.  This is because to most of those subject to it, order appears in the mind as 
something natural, necessary, and desirable, which blinds them to the fact that it is 
imposed upon them by for the purposes of maintaining conditions where exploitation and 
appropriation of the majority are possible and where the relationships it produces 
incessantly suppress alternative ways and knowing and being that do not serve to sustain 
the authority as such.   
From a position that is skeptical of authority, what Avery Gordon describes to as 
utopia’s “bad reputation” may otherwise be interpreted as the intentional suppression of 
other worlds and possibilities by the powerful representatives of a given order who “have 
always aimed to control those situationally transcendant ideas and interests which are not 
realizable within the bounds of the present order, and thereby to render them socially 
impotent, so that such ideas would be confined to a world beyond history and society, 
where they [cannot] affect the status quo.” (Mannheim 1936, p.193).  In this way, 
maintaining order is the art of constricting the possibility of freedom beyond its borders; 
“political economy has always confined itself to stating facts occurring in society, and 
justifying them in the interest of the dominant class” (Kropotkin 2011, p.232).   
When the powerful actors of a given order feel their authority is being challenged 
or they wish to impose it upon others, they must find ways to adapt that do not endanger 
their privileged position by continuously multiplying, transforming, and reorganizing the 
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symbolic, linguistic, temporal, cultural, epistemological, and ontological borders that 
maintain its powerful position.  In Border as Method, or the Multiplication of Labor 
(2013, p.v), Mezzadra and Neilson describes how this phenomenon as the multiplication 
of labor, arguing that these boundaries “overlap, connect, and disconnect in often 
unpredictable ways, contributing to shaping new forms of domination and exploitation” 
that allow for the growth of capitalism.  While the structures may transform over time, 
they engineered so as to maintain the same social structures and privileges.   
Besides the constant reconfiguration and production of borders, another important 
part of maintaining a social order is making it appear natural, necessary, and desirable to 
its subjects so that they will be less inclined question the authority that it privileges.  To 
accomplish this, dystopian visions are often deployed to produce a collective anxiety 
about a possible future that occurs in the absence of the social order it is trying to 
necessitate in the minds of its subjects.  In other words, those who take as truth the 
assumptions that justify the existence of the relations of domination, voluntarily submit 
themselves to hierarchical power relationships because they have come to believe either 
that the order is inevitable, that it is the only alternative to chaos, and that the sources of 
authority that maintain it can make better decisions about their own wellbeing than they 
can themselves. At the same time, the subjects come to encourage the suppression of 
anyone or anything that challenges the universal assumptions that rationalize the 
existence of the authority responsible for maintaining order and condone the imposition 
of this order upon all others for their own welfare regardless of whether or not they share 
the same assumptions.  In turn, those subject to an order fear not only the consequence of 
behaving in ways that challenge the perspectives perpetuated by the authority form which 
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are formed according to the unchangeable god-given, truths about reality, but also direct 
the repercussions delivered from the authority itself as a result of challenging its power.  
For example, because the orthodox Catholic depends upon the church for the salvation of 
their soul, they come to fear the authority of the church as much as the authority of God. 
The reason fascist truths are so effective in justifying authority, is that they create 
terrifying imaginaries regarding what the world would be like in the absence the order it 
maintains, which compel those who take up these imaginaries to think and behave with 
the interests of the authority in mind.  Where utopia is based in an either conscious or 
unconscious optimism about the future possibilities of living with other people, order is 
rooted in the perpetuation of fixed, fear-based, assumptions about reality, ignoring the 
fact that the order is most often what produces them.  For example, the belief that 
humanity cannot produce enough food to feed every human on earth is a direct result of 
the conditions produced by the given order: “the omnipresent scarcity we experience is 
an artifact: of our money system, of our politics, and of our perceptions… ….for 
something to become an object of commerce, it must be made scarce first” (Eisenstein 
2004, p.29). 
Food scarcity drives commodity prices up and labor costs down, creating ideal 
conditions of exploitation, and justifying increased security, which appears necessary to 
maintain order.  In sum, while the order appears natural, necessary, and desirable by its 
subjects for its capacity to maintain justice in a world of inherent scarcity, where violence 
and starvation are rampant, they take for granted the fact that the order itself is 
responsible for maintaining a system of power relations that separates people from their 
ability to feed themselves and live autonomously.  In effect, the detrimental aspects of the 
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relations maintained by the order are accepted as just in the present by many of its 
subjects, because the order promises “progress” towards a more just society in the future 
that can only result by tightening the grip of the status quo upon its subjects, despite the 
fact that it has only led to increased political-economic stratification. 
 According to parameters I laid out in the previous section of what comprises a 
dangerous utopian vision, it is a system of social relationships based upon generalized 
assumptions which produce a fear-based imaginary that requires it be imposed upon 
others and where justice is always relegated to the future.  In other words, when order is 
imposed on others it inevitably leads to a dystopian world where difference cannot exist 
as such across time and space; the negation of self-determined utopian visions as 
possible.  A place where dignity is hard to come by because of the presence of a crushing 
cultural, political, and economic order that attempts to dictate what its subjects think is 
important, how they can attain it, and what is possible in terms of human relations.  This 
is a problem for both justice and survival of the species, when you consider that diverse 
ways of know and being are not only necessary to maintain a group’s dignity and self-
respect, but to avoid tragedy and failure.    
A utopian vision that provides justice for everyone must recognize difference and 
be democratically established in order to not only maintain itself over time, but to allow 
all types of ontologies and epistemologies to thrive in the absence of a system maintained 
through political-economic domination that produces inequalities in class, race, gender, 
etc.  This is due to the fact that rigid frameworks inevitably produce unequal power 
relations that do not allow for alternative locally-specific knowledge systems and ways of 
being that are necessary not only for an egalitarian or democratic society, but for 
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sustainable human survival, to be desired, to exist in the imagination, or to be manifested 
in reality. 
The utopian is never a totalized space where injustice is nowhere to be found and 
difference is eliminated, but rather a transhistorical process that is constantly evolving 
over time, accounting for variation, and reproducing itself through democratic means.  
This type of vision implies a dynamic understanding of justice upon which experiments 
in alternative ways of knowing and being are conducted in order to examine the 
potentials of human sociality.  In order to account for the fact that failure is a likely 
possibility due to the limitations of the human imagination, that which is done must 
easily be undone without serious consequences and where unlike an ordered society, 
where freedom is granted in different degrees, everyone participating in its 
decisionmaking process are accountable to their own choices.   
The utopian longing is the vigilant challenge of convention, which incessantly 
“breaks the bonds of the existing order” that have allowed the authorities that benefit 
from the order to exist as such (Mannheim 1936, p.192).  It is simultaneously a form of 
resistance against the tyranny of instrumental orthodoxy and a guide on the path towards 
self-determination that drives its claimants into the incredible and unknowable in the 
pursuit of justice according to the way they have come to imagine the world.  In other 
words, utopia is heresy; opposition to the orthodox ways of knowing and being that 
reproduce authoritative power structures in a dominant order.  It is for this reason that the 
rebellion of heretics is constantly suppressed by the will of the divine clergy and their 
faithful followers; those who do not benefit from the order, but are compelled to martyr 
their dignity and freedom for the sake of the order and deny even the possibility that 
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another world is possible.  A world in the absence of a rigid order that places its 
inhabitants in relationships with one another that exponentially increases the proportion 
of people who are deemed unworthy of being included in the dominant form social and 
political justice. 
The claimants of heretical utopias are infidels; nonbelievers, who find themselves 
located in an order maintained by the most faithful, but still refuse to blindly submit their 
wills to authority.  One can prove their faith and gain power through the order by 
enforcing their beliefs by imposing them on others as is the case with state actors, 
including soldiers and police; to protect themselves and others from their biggest fears 
that may or may not be true, but are necessary to warrant their authority they are 
subsequently granted and the relationships it preserves.  The faithful ignore the fact that 
heretics only exist as such in the eyes of a specific authority and those who worship it due 
to the fact that either their ability to imagine the world in another way is impaired by their 
constrained understanding of what is possible or because they seek to maintain the 
privileged position they are granted by the established order and in turn, perpetuate 
beliefs that maintain it as such.   
The most devout followers of orthodox religion are those who have managed to 
make their worldview immune to rendering itself obsolete through exposure to alternative 
knowledge systems through the practice of willful ignorance.  This is accomplished by 
deploying a fear-based imaginary, such as one where a supreme authority (God) requires 
under penalty of eternal damnation (a punishment far more cruel than any that threatened 
by an imaginary rooted in materiality) that the breadth of perspectives his followers are 
permitted access to, which could potentially challenge the universal assumptions that 
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shape their imaginary as such, be constrained.  This is especially true when those 
perspectives produce what are considered to be universal truths that contradict the fear-
based imaginary they are perpetuating, such as other religions or scientific theory. In this 
way, “the utopian is not what is actually impossible or unrealizable, rather it represents 
the limit of permissable truth” (Gordon, 2004, p.122).  The same is the case with any type 
of authority that is deployed to strike fear into the heart of its subjects, which takes place 
where they either come to believe the assumptions that justify the existence of the 
authority or where they fear violent repression from it.  This a problem for justice when 
you consider that it is impossible to know the truth when it cannot be challenged first.  
The more a person refuses to allow themselves to test the limits of possibility, the more 
their perspectives become inconsistent with the real limitations of reality.   
A society is never completely utopian or dystopian, but rather its form is a 
constant negotiation of what visions are permitted; the extent that authority and 
democracy that are present in a particular time and space.  For example, consider a 
society with an influential orthodox religious institution and an authoritarian state that is 
controlled by dominant economic groups operating from an ideology that makes them 
unconcerned for the welfare of others and who understand human difference as a system 
of categories and rankings generated from an objective position.  This space would be 
dystopian for almost everyone that found themselves there, especially if these systems of 
domination organized themselves as interlocking directorates.   
Where these ideological webs of power overlap is where they are the most 
effective because where the beliefs of one system fail to conscript the imagination, they 
are still potentially vulnerable through another system.  For example, those who do not 
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believe in the myths in the bible because they are scientists and in turn, reject any reality 
of the curse of Ham, could still potentially be convinced that race exists beyond a social 
construct through the deployment of racial and cultural pseudoscience. This logic 
parallels Bakunin’s (1970; p.24) where he describes how God relates to the state, writing 
that as “slaves of God, men must also be slaves of the church and State, in so far as the 
State is consecrated by the Church.”  Perhaps this is why Dennis Diderot’s character in 
Le Religieuse (1830), Susan Simon, insists that “man will never be free until the last king 
is strangled with the entrails of the last priest.”  
Now consider a society that denies the authority of orthodox religion the capacity 
to have influence over non-believers, is democratically organized both politically and 
economically, in such a way that difference is both recognized and valued as such.  This 
is a heretic’s dream; a world whose claimant’s sense of justice does not require 
unwarranted obedience to an authority rooted assumptions that are not understood as 
being consistent with reality.  It is important to point out that rejecting unwarranted 
authority does not mean rejecting all authority.  For example in its self-defeating form, an 
authority legitimates itself as useful or desirable through the experience of living with 
one another because its subjects exist as such voluntarily and the hierarchy ceases to 
function when its purpose has become unnecessary.  For example, when a person wants 
to learn martial arts, they often voluntarily subject themselves to the authority of an 
instructor, assuming that they possess superior capabilities or knowledge of techniques, 
training methods, and strategies than themselves.  In order to test this assumptions to be 
sure that the instructors claims are congruent with the reality, it would require that the 
instructor provide evidence of the effectiveness of what they can deliver their student; 
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proof of their competence.  However, if an instructor either has been surpassed in both 
ability and knowledge by their student or cannot prove themselves as genuinely superior, 
they no longer hold legitimate authority over them; it is at the same time self-legitimating 
and self-defeating.   
Because order requires the suppression of difference, for a utopian vision to 
require that order be imposed on others, implies that the visionary understands difference 
in the world through a series of categories and rankings that privileges the authority of 
certain groups.  When order is imposed or voluntarily accepted, it suppresses the utopian 
visions of those subject to it regardless of whether they see the authority it is seeking to 
maintain as legitimate or not.  In other words, a group’s access to justice in an established 
order is determined according to the way the dominant group imagines the world and 
behaves accordingly, regardless of whether the groups subject to the order trust the 
assumptions that are used to justify imposing it on them.   
A utopian vision consists of what a person or group desires their society to value, 
how they imagine a world that has organized itself around these values, and how they are 
behaving in material reality consequently.  Each of which, are reflections of injustices 
they have come to see in the world according to how we imagine reality and understand 
difference.   This model holds true for the heretic who seeks to burst through the 
established order, in that utopia is a desire, an imaginary, and a material form occurring 
across time and space whose claimants understand the world in such a way that does not 
privilege constructions of authority that cannot prove their legitimacy and includes 
everyone in its sense of social and political justice; where “all people would have broadly 
equal access to the necessary material and social means to live flourishing lives…” and 
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possess “broadly equal access to the necessary means to participate meaningfully in 
decisions about things which affect their lives.  This includes both the freedom of 
individuals to make choices that affect their own lives as separate persons, and their 
capacity to participate in collective decisions which affect their lives as members of a 
broader community” (Wright 2010, p.12). 
This sense of justice requires taking democracy seriously; perhaps why Rudolf 
Rocker suggests, “all people should have a say in decisions proportionate to the degree 
they are affected by them’ (as cited in Day 2005, p.212).  For example, in a socially and 
politically just society the decision as to whether to build a dangerous chemical plant 
within close proximity to an impoverished neighborhood, would primarily be left up to 
the residents of that area because they are the ones that will be most subject to its effects, 
as opposed to leaving the decision up to profiteers who are not accountable to their own 
destructive and biocidal tendencies. 
 
The Three Dimensions of Utopia 
 
 An act of heresy functions as a sort of counter-orthodoxy that challenges the 
legitimacy of the limits of possible truth within a given social order.  The method of 
maintaining a social order is not limited to physical coercion, but rather its reproduction 
also depends upon its capacity to align the desires and imaginaries of its subjects and in 
turn, heretical behavior occur not just beyond our bodies, but within our conscious 
experience.  In other words, utopia is not bound to a specific space and time, but rather it 
exists in three separate dimensions in which humans experience the world: the utopian 
impulse, the utopian imaginary, and utopian form.   
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Constructing a utopian world always begins with desire, which implies 
dissatisfaction with the present world and compels us to imagine and build alternatives.  
In The Principle of Hope (1954), Ernst Bloch describes the utopian impulse as the 
universal human need to create a perfect life for ourselves and those that come after us; 
our discontent with the present world and the desire to live in an alternative one 
according to our sense of justice.  This occurs in the woman longing for a way to feed 
herself and her family.  She has not yet attempted to fantasize about having food, nor 
developed a solution, but has merely acknowledged injustice according to the way she 
imagines the world; as a place where her family is of surviving regardless of the opinion 
of the status quo.  The utopian impulse does not imply the production or experience of a 
utopian world, but merely represents the longing for it.  In fact, the imaginaries and 
material manifestations that result from the utopian impulse are often inconsistent with it. 
In Of Other Spaces (1967, p.3), Michel Foucault asserts that “utopias are sites 
with no real place.  They are sites that have a general relation of direct or inverted 
analogy with the real space of Society.  They present society itself in a perfected form, or 
else society turned upside down, but in any case these utopias are fundamentally unreal 
places.”  Foucault contrasted utopias with what referred to as heteropias, which are 
something like “counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which real sites, all 
the other real sites can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, 
contested, and inverted.  Places of this kind are outside of all places, even though it may 
be possible to indicate their location in reality.”  Heterotopias are “other” spaces that 
make “normality” possible the same way that the belief in a heaven degrades reality; if 
heaven exists and it is paradise, than reality is dreadful compared to it.   
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According to Foucault (1967, p.3), heterotopias have a similar nature to that of 
mirrors: “it makes the place that I occupy at the moment when I look at myself in the 
glass at once absolutely real, connected with all the space that surrounds it, and 
absolutely unreal, since in order to be perceived it has to pass through this virtual point 
which is over there.”  While the image in the mirror is a placeless place, the mirror itself 
a heterotopia, a utopian form, because it serves as a medium through which the utopian 
consciousness, the desire for and vision of another world, is manifested according to the 
circumstances presented in how a person imagines material reality.  I say “imagine” 
reality because one does not simply possess the capability to fully comprehend reality as 
it is occurring throughout space and time, so they rely on their imaginations to construct, 
according to their experiences that have shaped them both consciously and 
subconsciously; a world that they imagine to be true.   
Similarly to Foucault (1967), in Envisioning Real Utopias (2010, p.5) Erik Olin 
Wright defines utopias as mere “fantasies, morally inspired designs for a humane world 
of peace and harmony unconstrained by realistic considerations of human psychology 
and social feasibility,” which distinguishes from what he considers Real Utopias, or 
utopian forms that “[embrace] the tension between dreams and practice” and are 
“grounded in the belief that what is pragmatically possible is not fixed independently of 
our imaginations, but is itself shaped by our visions” (Wright 2010, p.5).  These are 
institutions rooted in “utopian ideals that are grounded in the real potentials of humanity” 
and “can inform our practical tasks of navigating a world of imperfect conditions for 
social change” (Wright 2010, p.6).  They need not be “feasible or desirable under all 
social conditions,” but only in “some conditions, likely to be realized now or in the 
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future, under which the model will succeed” (Huemer 2012, p.196).  In sum, real utopias 
are spaces that represent humanity’s attempts to address injustices in the world in forms 
grounded in the actual conditions material reality presents at some point in time. 
  Both Foucault (1967) and Wright (2010) distinguish between utopian visions and 
manifestations in their frameworks.  Those that are merely imagined were constructed in 
what I will refer to as the utopian imaginary, or the human capacity to imagine a more 
just world and the ways in which people might live in it.  This faculty is functioning 
when the starving woman imagines herself feasting and devising a plan to manifest this 
fantasy in reality according to her sense of justice and the way she imagines the world, 
such as taking her share of food directly from those who have denied her access to it.   
The utopian imaginary is unbound by space and time and is not limited to that which we 
have directly experienced and in turn, the faculty pulls from how we imagine the 
experiences of other people, real or imagined.  This is why in The Educated Imagination 
(1964, p.101) Northrop Frye argued that “no matter how much experience we may gather 
in life, we can never in life get the dimension of experience that the imagination gives 
us.”  It is also why utopian visions do not always come out just as their claimants imagine 
them, because the process of manifesting the utopian consciousness into reality is 
constrained by the incongruences that exist between a person’s utopian visions and the 
way they imagine reality.  In other words, not only are their cognitive capacities 
insufficient in their ability to create a utopian vision that recognizes how it’s ideal would 
shape every relation in the way they imagine the world, but the way they imagine the 
world is also not sufficient to provide a perfect understanding of it to begin with outside 
of a limited specific temporal, material, and cultural space.   
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To ask of someone to build a perfect, universally-just, world is like scattering the 
experiences that make up a single child’s imagination around the floor of a large room 
that is pitch black, then giving them a flashlight and asking them to construct a perfect 
world according to how they imagine it.  Not only would it be impossible to reflect all of 
these experiences in their utopian vision, but even if they could, the sum total is not a 
sufficient representation of reality as it is limited to a single set of frameworks and 
interpretations that does not account for the desires, imaginings, and material conditions 
of others: 
We cooperate to produce our individual and social lives based on our sense of 
what is valuable. But the whole scope of that cooperation, the multitude of 
collaborative, conflicting factors that go into our personal and collective 
reproduction, is unfathomable. There are simply too many moving parts; there is 
too much information. To grasp this process, and to give substance to our ideas of 
value, we rely on the imagination. In this sense, the imagination is inherently and 
eternally flawed: it is a sense of the whole made up of only partial information. So 
while the way we imagine the world and our social cooperation is always only 
partial, it is still necessary. (Haiven 2014, loc. 753-762) 
 
When combined, the utopian impulse and the utopian imaginary form utopian 
consciousness, which is not in itself dangerous, but does shape the behavior of the one 
experiencing it.  The utopian consciousness represents the experience of having the 
simultaneous desire and imaginary that are necessary to summon the third dimension of 
utopia; the utopian form.    
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Frederick Jameson (2004, p.1) defines the utopian form as “the Utopian impulse 
detectable in daily life.”  Because even the very etymology of utopia implies a “placeless 
place” the utopian form is a hypocritical concept, but the spaces it produces often retain 
many of the characteristics it acquired in the utopian imaginary, which is born of the 
utopian impulse.  In this way, It represents the act of manifesting other worlds in material 
reality; acting with dignity.  These forms can manifest themselves in a variety of ways, in 
that that they can be in the form of relationships, artwork, books (fiction or nonfiction), 
architecture, clothing, food, behaviors, technology because the content is not important, 
formed according to someones’s experience with privilege and oppression, but rather the 
container is what counts; Experiencing the world as it could be otherwise. In this way, it 
is: 
through shared experiences, language, stories, ideas, art, and theory we share part 
of our imagination.  People create, with those around then, multiple, overlapping, 
contradictory and coexistent imaginary landscapes, horizons of common 
possibility and shared understanding…” and the “…shared landscapes are shaped 
by and also shape the imaginations and the actions of their participant individuals 
(Haiven 2014, p.4). 
 
The moment she realized she was incapable of satisfying her hunger within the 
confines of the established order, the starving woman experienced the utopian impulse 
and became a heretic.  The utopian imaginary entices her with the possibility of a world 
where her hunger is satiated and she tries to imagine how to bridge the gap between her 
world by linking it to her material conditions.  After careful consideration and planning, 
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she acts on her imaginary and moves into the realm of the utopian form by distracting a 
waiter and stealing a platter from the patio table at a bourgeois restaurant.  However, 
unlike the way she imagined executing the heist, she forgets to tie her shoe and falls, 
dropping half of it on the floor.  When woman finally finds a place to rest and eat what 
remains of her meal, her experience with the utopian form ceases.    
 
Conclusion 
 
 At the beginning of this section I described the problem of systemic hopelessness 
as a barrier to social change.  It is a beating down of possibility that occurs through a 
conflation of real utopian prospects and dystopian nightmares that occurs in the presence 
of an order that attempts to suppress political-economic possibility by conscripting the 
imaginations of those subject to the order through the perpetuation of fear-based 
universal truths that warrant the imposition of authority upon others, which incessantly 
encroaches upon the very existence of heretics and anyone else whose ways of knowing 
and being are incompatible with the established order.  An order that attempts to 
eradicate the instinct for freedom and devalues dignity in our lives, resulting in a 
systemic erosion of the will that is necessary for the manifestation of a world where the 
dominant conception of justice includes everyone, rather than dividing humanity into 
categories and rankings based upon illegitimate assumptions concerning the universal 
nature of social and material reality. 
In chapter 2 I will attempt to explain the nature of a few of these taken for granted 
assumptions that justify a few of the most powerful sources of authority in the United 
States, which constrain possibility and produce a sense of hopelessness in those who 
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understand them as truth.  From here, I will address why these assumptions are 
problematic and begin to explore how to effectively restructure the architecture of the 
cultural imaginary in a way that is consistent with real possibility and the experience of 
living with one another in alternative ways; a cultural imaginary that allows for the 
existence of other ways of knowing and being. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ORDER AND THE FASCIST CULTURAL IMAGINARY 
What is the Cultural Imaginary and why does it matter? 
 
Albert Einstein called the intuitive or metaphoric mind a sacred gift.  He added 
that the rational mind was a faithful servant. It is paradoxical that in the context of 
modern life we have begun to worship the servant and defile the divine. (Bob 
Samples 1976 p.26) 
 
I’m not exactly sure why Albert Einstein would call the “intuitive or metaphoric 
mind” a “sacred gift,” but I assume it is because intuition allows for flexibility in thought 
and some level of self-determination in the human imagination, despite being immersed 
in an order produced from the imaginary of a rational structure based upon cultural 
assumptions that interminably attempt to colonize the utopian consciousness and conduct 
with the will of the dominant group.  This would imply that the rational mind creates a 
“faithful servant,” where the world is understood through a rigid framework of universal, 
God-given, assumptions about reality that determines who is included in its claimant’s 
sense of justice, legitimates the authority of dominant groups to impose order on others, 
which inevitably results in dystopian visions.  When manifested, dystopian visions 
produce worlds where power structures are organized in ways that increasingly centralize 
power by shaping the desires, imaginaries, and behaviors of civil-society in ways that 
benefit the interests of the visionary.   
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In Crises of Imagination, Crises of power: Capitalism, Creativity, and the 
Commons” (Haiven 2014, loc. 963), Max Haiven describes the dialectical relationship 
between value and imagination when he writes: 
We rely on our imaginations to give us a coherent sense of experience, of 
reproductive cooperation, of the world around us. How a person imagines their 
relations shapes what and who they value. Meanwhile, their values, in effect, 
shape their imaginations.  In other words, their cultural values determine what 
they think is important and the types of behaviors and attitudes that they believe 
will allow them to achieve their desires; how they ascribe meaning to the world. 
 
 However, because social relationships are far too complicated and dynamic for humans 
to fully comprehend at any given time, the way they behave in the world is very much the 
result of the way we imagine reality according to “taken for granted” assumptions, which 
attempt to fill the gaps in our understanding.  In this way, these verities determine the 
architecture of this political-economic imagination, which arranges these interpretations 
into a “collage of experiences” as per Jameson (2004, p.xii), which produces a specific of 
cognition of reality and its constituent power relationships.  This process is what is 
referred to as the cultural imaginary, which shapes a person’s sense of justice and who is 
included in it according to what they think is important, how they can get there, and the 
way they imagine the world. 
For, Charles Taylor (2004, p.23) the “social imaginary” is the faculty that grants 
humans the capacity to imagine the world around them and where they fit into that vision.  
However, as Chad Lakies notes in Challenging the Cultural Imaginary: Pieper on How 
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Life might Be (cited in Lakies 2010, p.500), Graham Ward (2005) prefers the term 
“cultural imaginary” because he contends that “even the idea of the social is situated 
within and emerges from the cultural.”  He suggests that “there need to be then, new 
understandings of what constitutes the social and society as distinct from the cultural and 
culture, but it cannot be on the grounds of some myth of the given; human beings in some 
immediate and ‘raw’ mode of cohabitation.   
The cultural imaginary as the magma of social significations makes many forms 
of sociality possible” (Ward 2005, p.163-164).  Where Ward describes the cultural 
imaginary as the “magma of social significations,” what he means is that the cultural 
imaginary is essentially a flowing form of representations of the world that are constantly 
competing for precedence over one another as their claimant moves through space and 
time.  The structures that shape this flow is what will refer to as the architecture of the 
cultural imaginary; the structuring of the mechanisms of control that shape possibility in 
terms of what a person thinks is important, how to achieve it there, and the way they 
imagine reality. 
Table 1 
How the Cultural Imaginary Shapes Utopian Visions 
 
 
 
 
As is illustrated in Table 1, because the cultural imaginary determines a person’s 
sense of justice and who is included in it, the architecture of one’s cultural  imaginary is 
congruent with the nature of their utopia, which exists in three dimensions; utopian 
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impulse, utopian imaginary, and utopian form.  For this reason, it effectively determines 
if their vision is utopian or dystopian and whether a person considers utopian alternatives 
to be possible, necessary, and desirable or naïve, frivolous, and ill-fated based on whether 
they believe contemporary relations under the present order to be relatively just according 
to how they understand the world in their cultural imaginary.  This is because the nature 
of one’s cultural imaginary determines whether their orientation towards justice is 
consistent with the dominant conception that is perpetuated by authoritative structures in 
society such as the religion, the state, and capital.  For this reason, the cultural imaginary 
cannot be separated from the utopian, because the latter exists as a reflection of 
someone’s individual understanding of justice and what groups are included in it, which 
is formed according what they think is important (utopian impulse), how they imagine 
achieving it, (utopian imaginary), and how they imagine the world around them (utopian 
form); three concepts that do not operate independently of one another as I described 
earlier. 
 Chris Kyle was a highly decorated Navy SEAL sniper who became well known 
for his accomplishments in combat in Iraq where he had 160 confirmed kills (he allegedly 
had 95 more, but they were not confirmed) over the four tours spent there (Kyle 2013).  
In 2012, he released a memoir titled American Sniper: Most Deadly Soldier in U.S. 
History (2013, p.6), where he describes his experiences and thoughts regarding his time 
in Iraq: “I loved what I did… I’m not lying or exaggerating to say it was fun.” He also 
describes the fortitude of his hatred for Muslims and Arabs, writing: “on the front of my 
arm I had a crusader cross inked in.  I wanted everyone to know that I was a Christian.  I 
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had it put in red for blood.  I hated the damn savages I’d been fighting.  I always will” 
(Kyle 2013, p.219).   
In November of 2014, a film based upon the book titled American Sniper (2014) 
was released and quickly became the year’s highest grossing movie after taking in over 
$250 million dollars in the first three months and being nominated for six academy 
awards including best picture.  The movie was very well received by the American public 
and the majority of film critics, which is disturbing when you consider the fact that 
according to the national legal and policy director for the American Arab anti-
Discrimination Committee, Abed Ayoub, it sparked a wave of hatred against Muslims 
and Arabs in the form of physical attacks and violent threats over social media, causing 
their prevalence to spike to a rate not seen since 2010, when plans were proposed to build 
a mosque at ground zero (Mosburgen, 2014).  These were people who could truly relate 
to the message that Chris Kyle was putting across and the world that he desired to create; 
they understood his desires, imaginary, and actions as justified.  In other words, they 
shared a similar cultural imaginary, orientation towards justice, and in turn utopian vision 
as Chris Kyle, a man who not only blatantly lied about a number his experiences in order 
to bolster his reputation among conservative America, including killing carjackers, 
assaulting Jesse Ventura in a bar, and sniping residents of New Orleans from the roof of 
the superdome after hurricane Katrina, but was overt about his racism, hatred, and 
psychopathy in his memoirs and interviews.   
These resources can provide us some insight into the nature of Kyle’s cultural 
values and political-economic imagination that make shape his cultural imaginary; a 
world where going to another country, condemning their beliefs, dehumanizing and 
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torturing them, murdering them in droves, and bragging about it makes you a celebrated 
hero.  This is a world shaped by hegemonic beliefs regarding Muslims, Arabs, terrorism, 
and security that structure the dominant cultural imaginary of a post-9/11 United States; 
producing a cultural resentment toward these groups that has contributed to their 
expulsion from hegemonic sense of justice, as is reflected in the 54 percent increase in 
the number of Christian and white supremacist groups between the years 2000 and 2008 
(Potok, 2010).  These political organizations were formed as the result of taken for 
granted assumptions about how whites must relate to Arabic people in order to protect 
their interests that are perpetuated by the ruling elite whose interests lie in the political 
and economic domination of Northern Africa.  These beliefs structure both their cultural 
values and their political-economic imaginations, resulting in the formation of a cultural 
imaginary and in turn, a sense of justice where acts of unrestrained violence towards 
these groups are not only justified, but necessary and desirable to protect the people of 
the United States from the “irrational, religion-frenzied, savages” that cannot be dealt 
with in any other way.   
A conception of justice can only shape a dystopian vision when you consider the 
dangerous aspects of utopian thought that I laid out in chapter 1.  If you break down the 
utopian vision produced by this cultural imaginary into its three dimensions, it reveals 
how a universal understanding of reality must be imposed on others.  In the first 
dimension: utopian impulse, for Kyle it is to protect “us” (white American) from them 
(terrorists, who are equated with Arabs and Muslims) at any cost, even torture and mass 
murder.  In the second dimension of the utopian, the utopian imaginary, the way they 
imagine manifesting this world is by slaughtering Muslim and Arabic peoples or anyone 
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whose utopian vision contradicts their own because it is the only way of dealing with 
irrational religious fanatics who are incapable of diplomacy.  Finally, the third dimension 
is the utopian form, exists where the claimants of this utopian vision manifest their vision 
to harm Arabs and Muslims in the material world through violence, social networking, 
joining the military or police, or going to watch patriot porn about the story of a “real 
American hero.”  In the hegemonic cultural imaginary of a post-9/11 United States, Chris 
Kyle, the racist, psychopathic, mendacious, mass-murderer, is a utopian actor working 
towards making the world a better place for those who belong to the established order he 
seeks to protect and maintain. 
Now that I have demonstrated how this framework can give us insight into how 
justice and the utopian are shaped by the cultural imaginary, in the next section I will 
attempt to explore how the hegemonic cultural imaginary in liberal-democratic capitalist 
societies, such as the United States, organizes one’s taken for granted assumptions 
regarding the fundamental nature of reality.  I will begin by discussing how cultural 
values and the architecture of the political-economic are systematically organized in such 
a way as to constrain the possibility of longing for, imagining, and manifesting another 
world, while simultaneously perpetuating the dominant order so that I can be imposed 
upon others.  Then I will begin to explore the nature of the systemic hopelessness that 
plagues the United States so that I can begin to look at ways to emancipate our cultural 
imaginaries, unleash possibility, and resuscitate the instinct for freedom in the 
contemporary world. 
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The Architecture of the Fascist Cultural Imaginary 
 
As I discussed earlier, the cultural imaginary determines how one understands the 
world and imagines the way people relate to one another.  In turn, multiple actors with 
varying cultural imaginaries will interpret the same experience differently depending 
upon what they think is important, how they get there, and the way they imagine the 
world and the people it contains.  Such a negotiation is taking place between everyone in 
in the world with regard to all there is to experience, even things that do not exist 
materially such as the various theories regarding the nature of the divine, which 
perpetuates constant conflict over how people imagine the same circumstances and 
choose to behave accordingly.   
While not all cultural imaginaries create a perspective that such an orientations is 
natural, necessary, and desirable for everyone to share the same cultural imaginary as 
themselves, for those who do it is either because they are not even aware that people do 
imagine the world differently, because they regard alternatives as inferior to their own 
and do not respect their validity, or because they simply do not care if other perspectives 
die out.  This type of view that constrains possibility occurs in people who are trying to 
imagine the world from a position which allows them to comprehend only a very limited 
amount of information and meanings, which produces an inadequate vision of reality 
compared to those who do have access other ways of imagining.   
The heterogeneity of humanity’s capacity to imagine the world is like a room full 
of people who all speak different languages and some speak more than others; where 
those who cannot speak multiple languages are actively and purposefully deprived of the 
ability to grasp the situation when compared to those who can.  In other words, their 
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abilities to comprehend the workings of social and material reality are more diverse, 
which gives them a great advantage to gain power over those whose capacity to interpret 
the world is more limited, or as I mentioned earlier: humans are the most vulnerable to 
manipulation in cognitive spaces they cannot imagine. 
There are two primary factors that determine whether a person’s cultural 
imaginary is constrained, the first of which is the degree to which they are exposed to 
other cultural imaginaries.  For example, a person who grows up in an environment 
where they are exposed to a variety of ways of knowing and being such as a metropolitan 
city and regularly interacts with people of diverse backgrounds is more likely consider 
the meanings derived from multiple perspectives as valid and useful, whereas someone 
who is socialized in a tight-knit, isolated, community will have less opportunities and 
reasons to imagine the world otherwise and in turn, fail to comprehend the validity of 
alternative perspectives.  This is because for those who are socialized in a heterogeneous 
environment are more likely to experience contradictions between the way they imagine 
the world and their experience living in it with other people and in turn, come to realize 
the specificity of their own taken-for-granted beliefs, while the person from the isolated 
community is denied access to other ways of knowing and being that not only bring to 
light, but challenge their specific set of cultural assumptions. 
The second factor that shapes whether the claimant’s cultural imaginary is 
constrained is whether it is embedded with ideological mechanisms of control that limit 
access to other perspectives whose cultural values and imaginaries could potentially 
challenge the assumptions that justify maintaining a full-fledged devotion to the authority 
legitimated by their own cultural imaginary.  In other words, if there are inherent truths 
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embedded in a cultural imaginary that must upheld by their claimants at all costs, they are 
often protected by mechanisms of control that limit a person’s access to other 
perspectives.   
These mechanisms are the most rigid form of what Ward Churchill refers to as 
“structuring effects,” or the premise that “what we know constrains our ability to imagine 
what we don't know” (as cited in Liu 2009).  According to Ward, Smith, and Finke 
(1999, p.198), an individual or group’s subjection to these “structuring effects can be 
attributed to creators being led down a path of least resistance.  When instantiating the 
problem of developing a new idea, they are drawn to retrieve typical, specific instances of 
a known concept and then to project the properties of those instances to the empty frame 
of the novel idea.”  This is evident in Christianity where other ideological frameworks for 
interpreting divine reality are attributed to being attempts by Satan to confuse and test 
God’s followers; where those who stray from the path of the bible or attempt to learn 
about other ways of understanding reality are threatened with eternal damnation.  In turn, 
followers are coerced through threats of violence to limit the types of meanings and 
imaginings that they can utilize to make sense of the world and in turn, are deterred from 
exploring the possibility that their beliefs are not inherently true, which challenges the 
legitimacy of the church’s authority. 
For those who wish to control others, these mechanisms of control are useful for 
orienting the cultural imaginaries of others towards their own means.  This is because a 
cultural imaginary in which these mechanisms are present is much easier to map and 
understand because by limiting possibility they become less complicated, which makes it 
more legible to political predators and therefore more governable: a person is the most 
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vulnerable in spaces they cannot imagine.  Those with access to multiple perspectives can 
either use it to avoid manipulation by others or to control those who lack them by first 
mapping their cultural imaginaries to some degree and then using what they think is 
important, how to get there, and the way they imagine the world in order to perpetuate 
imaginaries that justify placing their creators in a position where they can exercise power.  
This can be accomplished by perpetuating ideas that may or may not be consistent with 
reality in order to justify the exchange of freedom and responsibility for servitude and 
security by building a set of categories and rankings, which come to be understood by the 
claimant as objective truths that are appropriate for making sense of reality.  These 
mechanisms of control that constrain possibility are an invaluable to those seeking to 
maintain order, especially when the truths produced by conflicting hegemonic cultural 
imaginaries can be used to pit groups against one another, deflecting blame away from 
the status quo.   
What makes these mechanisms of control so dangerous, is that they grant the 
capacity to manipulate someone in a way that does not require material evidence, but 
merely a scary story that coincides the way they understand reality.  This is evident in 
cases where a person seeking power attempts to justify their authority by rooting it in the 
divine, such as the historical English monarchy.  When its authority was linked to 
ideology of the Catholic Church in the early 17th century, the monarchy was elevated to 
the status of the divine and in turn, so were the consequences of disobeying its will.  Not 
only does celestial ideology allow a person who is not particularly exceptional the ability 
to claim to be without having to prove it, but it also gives them the capability to construct 
fear-based cultural imaginaries from which they can construct threats far more terrifying 
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than anything than could be exacted in material reality in order to compel certain 
behavior in their subjects.  This is an invaluable tool for maintaining order because the 
more fear the dominant group can invoke in its subjects, the more it legitimates and 
expands their authority.   
While the authority of the English monarchy had effectively maintained control of 
its subjects through physical coercion, there is nothing in the material world that can 
threaten humanity with horrific possibilities to the extent that religion can, nor is there 
any material surveillance apparatus that can be used to hold us accountable to these fears 
that are as inescapable and invasive as one’s own mind, which appears to be under the 
inescapable gaze of God’s judgment.  In turn, this type of imaginary is especially useful 
for those who wish to rule others, but are not exceptional in anything; it does not take a 
brave, intelligent, powerful, or creative person to make up a scary story, convince some 
people it is true and make themselves appear as if only they can provide protection.  For 
example, if a devout member of the Catholic Church commits a worthy offense against 
the church and other followers, such as desecrating the bible or rejecting the authority or 
jurisdiction of the pope as leader of the organization, they can be excommunicated.  In 
the catholic imagination, excommunication is a punishment that effectively separates a 
person from the capacity to save their soul from endless torture.  In turn, it serves as a 
powerful threat towards those with the incapacity to know the world otherwise because of 
the mechanisms of control that lay embedded in their cultural imaginary. 
When a person’s cultural imaginary becomes limited by ideological mechanisms 
of control, it often results in a sort of childish, fear-based, extremism that rejects any 
ideas that challenge the basis of their exclusive or dominant worldview. This dynamic is 
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demonstrated when a claimant has become so subject to the authority, either real or 
imagined, that they refuse to adjust their perspective even in the presence of 
overwhelming evidence that contradicts the “truths” from which the authority that makes 
their perspective valid to them is derived.  This is fascism, a political orientation that is 
born of a cultural imaginary that understands hierarchy as natural, necessary, and 
desirable for social justice because those operating from such a perspective determine 
how people must relate to one another through unchangeable, static, God-given 
assumptions about material reality and the people within it. Such a perspective is utilized 
by those who seek to rule others for its capacity to instrumentalize the behavior of its 
claimants so as to funnel public value towards private ends under the guise of necessity. 
The fascist cultural imaginary is a way of structuring the way a person 
understands the world through a series of frameworks that organize human difference 
into systems of categories and rankings, which are formed according to the assumptions 
that justify the privilege of the dominant form of authority to control its subjects even in 
the presence of evidence that contradicts these assumptions; where belief overpowers 
experience.  In this way, a perspective that is not required to provide evidence to justify 
the authority it grants, merely requires people who are too ignorant to demand it.  This is 
the case of the catholic physicist who rejects the nature of reality as he has experienced it 
in order to make room for the one he has been ascribed, but has failed to recognize as 
such.   
When an individual or group’s perspectives are explicitly constrained, it allows 
the established order to offer only a small spectrum of solutions to solve a crisis and then 
engage in a vibrant debate within that field, which is never threatening to the status quo 
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(Chomsky 2002).  This behavior is easily demonstrated by describing how political 
parties function, where the members of Republican and Democratic Parties, which are 
often difficult to distinguish not only because they are both subject to the will of capital 
through lobbying, but also because they will by default according to the parameters of 
their position vote to pass laws and decrees that maintain the established order and justify 
their power to rule others.   
The possibilities that exist outside the hegemonic spectrum of possibility that 
challenge commonsense logic are utopian, beyond limits of possibility within the 
architecture of the cultural imaginary, and therefore are not taken seriously because they 
are not compatible with the way the claimant understands the world and what is 
possible.2  In this way, the non-violent exercise of power takes place through the violent 
suppression of the imagination, effectively creating an incessant negotiation of truth and 
the limits of possibility.  Those who claim to offer universal truth, suggest the belief in a 
closed world that attempts to rationalize, simplify, and structure a diverse, dynamic, web 
of cultural imaginaries that overlap, create, destroy, and transform one another as their 
specificities collide in space and time through physical violence, appropriation, and the 
exchange of symbols in material reality.  If the word “radical” means “to the root,” 
perspectives that limit access to the interpretations of the world offered by other 
perspectives create a non-radical imaginary, which is both legible and governable and in 
turn, cannot move beyond commonsense assumptions about reality under a political-
economic order.  
 
                                                 
2 Perhaps this explains why children are so receptive, creative, and fascinated by the world; because they 
have not invented reasons to dismiss the possibilities provided by non-hegemonic perspectives yet.   
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The Hegemonic Cultural Imaginary of the United States 
 
When the architecture of the fascist cultural imaginary is organized in such a way 
that its claimant’s make sense of the world through a set of categories and rankings, 
where some things are inviolably “better” than others, where the claimant’s 
comprehension of reality is reduced to black and white thinking based upon simple direct 
causalities, effectively limiting the capacity to understand complex relationships available 
through other perspectives.  In turn, the utopian requires the emancipation of the 
imagination from the constraints of universal truths that must be imposed upon others to 
limit the possibility of another world to maintain order.  This section will elucidate the 
“taken for granted” structures of its hegemonic cultural imaginary.  Uncovering these 
cognitive mechanisms that compel their possessor to surrender power to the will of the 
order can provide them the opportunity to see beyond the architecture of the fascist 
cultural imaginary to comprehend a world rich in possibility; a utopian vision derived 
from a sense of justice that includes everyone.   
A person’s culture consists of a set of meanings that they share with other people 
that help them make sense of the world, while their political-economic imaginations 
consist of how they have constructed the world they imagine from those meanings.  In 
this way, culture is how humans interpret the world through the stories we share with 
others that we use to ascribe meaning to reality.  It determines how we negotiate the 
world according to the way we believe we should “naturally” relate to one another.  We 
only know a few stories, we understand the plot of each story to varying degrees, and we 
like some stories better than others because of the experiences we have shared with other 
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people who know the same stories and have grown fond of them as well in an 
environment where they have grown especially relevant and useful.  Because these 
stories are so attached to the processes of daily life, which makes them almost invisible to 
their claimants, they appear natural and taken for granted.   
Some of these stories suggest important reasons to ascribe certain meanings to 
reality and they become represented by symbols that invoke a specific meaning.  A 
symbol can mean different things to people with different cultures, but it also determines 
their attitudes and the kind of behavior the symbol compels independently of the 
meaning.  The cross almost universally represents the mythical crucifixion of Jesus 
Christ, but the degree to which that story is valued when compared to other stories shapes 
one’s attitude towards it and how they behave accordingly.  For example, when a 
Christian sees a cross they might feel inspired and pray, but when a heretic sees it they 
might be filled disgust and stomp it into bits. 
These stories are fictions that we, as humans, share with other people that help us 
to collectively negotiate reality with the people in our daily lives from the experience of 
living with others in a particular time and space.  The meanings of these stories are 
difficult to challenge in the mind of someone operating from a limited cultural framework 
who believe they understand the objective truth of reality and in turn, believe their 
perspective to be superior to alternative epistemologies, which are considered unnatural 
and inaccurate.  It is important to point out here that both certain cultural values and 
aspects of the political-econonomic imagination are often taken for granted as being 
objective or universal and because their claimants are not required to understand the 
origin of either component in order to operate from the perspective created by the 
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dialectic between them.  In turn, these components can shape one another without the 
claimant recognizing it as a result of the relationship or understanding the logic behind 
either component.  In other words, one does not have to be conscious of the nature of 
what they value in order to imagine the world accordingly, nor do they have to be aware 
of how the specific way they imagine the world shapes what they understand as 
important, in order for this relationship to exist and actively shape their behavior.  In fact, 
a claimant is not required to understand the reasoning behind either aspect in order 
operate from them and these values and imaginings can exist as taken for commonsense 
assumptions, completely disconnected from any source of logic, but able to maintain 
priority through the mechanisms of control embedded with them.   
When the architecture of the cultural imaginary is structured independently of 
conscious logic, it is extremely susceptible to manipulation because either component can 
be exploited, which shapes the entire faculty.  For example, a person who understands a 
world where private property maintained by the state in as natural, necessary, and 
desirable would have to value individual freedom as well and vice versa.  Understanding 
one component as commonsense, independent of its conscious logic, makes us 
understand the other in the same way.  In turn, to make either aspect taken for granted is 
to make the other operate the same way.  This implies that the meanings a person ascribes 
to reality through stories, regardless of whether they are conscious of them or have heard 
them or not, shape the political-economic imagination, and in turn the architecture of the 
cultural imaginary. 
Thomas Rochon (1998, p.9) defines culture as the “linked stock of ideas that 
define a set of commonsense beliefs about what is right, what is natural, what works 
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(Rochon 1998, p.9).  The most prevalent “linked stock of ideas” is generally the one 
perpetuated by the dominant order, one that propagates myths that can cause its subjects 
into conflate their interests with those attempting to maintain the order from which they 
benefit: 
As Roland Barthes suggests, the production and dissemination of bourgeois 
ideology require a process of myth-making that distorts and appropriates objects 
by emptying them of their history and then investing them with new meanings.  
The new meanings constitute a mystification that naturalizes a concept.  This 
mystification obscures causality and contingency in order to legitimize the 
bourgeois order, making its values seem natural, eternally given, ahistorical, and 
inevitable.    Dominant discourses of social class mystify poverty by erasing the 
historical and economic conditions that produce, indeed require, it in advanced 
capitalism. These discourses then replace history with a cultural myth:  that 
anyone who is willing to work hard will rise out of poverty and that anyone who 
cannot rise out of poverty is either unwilling to do so--lazy--or naturally incapable 
of any human development. (Folks and Folks 2000, p.117-118) 
 
This passage makes it clear that myths conceal as much as they reveal about 
reality and the oppressed are compelled by their understanding of social forces, which are 
shaped by the logic of stories, to maintain and behave according to the cultural values of 
the dominant group to which they are subjected (Strauss 1979).  This is not always 
because they desire to be subjected, but rather that they have come to believe that they 
share the same interests and can also achieve success by organizing their life processes 
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around these values.  These phenomenon is what Antonio Gramsci (1971) calls “cultural 
hegemony,” which is described by Judith Halberstam (2011, p.17) as “a multilayered 
system by which a dominant group achieves power not through coercion but through the 
production of an interlocking system of ideas which persuades people of the rightness of 
any given set of often contradictory ideas and perspective.”   
Hegemony occurs “in the sphere of civil-society, Gramsci argued, [when] the 
‘great masses of the population’ give their ‘spontaneous’ consent’ to the ‘general 
direction imposed on social life by a dominant fundamental group,’" (Gramsci 
1971)(cited in Day 2005, p.63).  While hegemony pervades civil-society to various 
extents across space and time, it is important to point out that this “process” is never 
complete and the actions of a dominant group are always open to contestation” (Day 
2005, p.7).  In addition, hegemony, whether it exists in the realms of the real or imagined, 
if they can even be separated, is always cultural (P.M. 2011). 
Hegemony operates by creating a specific structure of significations that interlock 
and are consistent with one another, effectively becoming “commonsense” over time as 
its specific assumptions become presupposed and function instinctually or without 
conscience intent.  When the specificity of this framework of assumptions ceases to be 
recognized as such, it becomes “a set of beliefs that are persuasive precisely because they 
do not present themselves as ideology or try to win consent,” which produces an 
understanding of the world where systemic domination is taken for granted and other 
ways of knowing and being are dismissed by the very nature of what is considered 
objective truth, not epistemological and ontological specificity (Halberstam 2011, p.17).   
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When a person operates from a hegemonic cultural framework, they tend to 
interpret the new information according their “taken for granted” preconceptions that 
appear natural, necessary, and desirable; a framework that keeps their eyes clamped shut 
in the presence of anything that challenges their understanding of reality.  Such a 
perspective makes a person vulnerable to manipulation and closes off possibility because 
“it is almost impossible to overestimate the power of cultural ideas to condition observers 
to see certain facts but not other facts, and above all to suggest interpretations of the facts 
that are seen” (Rochon 1998, p.60).  This is why people tend to believe that we as 
humans, see things ‘“as they really are, but that everyone else's vision is clouded. We 
resolve cognitive dissonance in the most self-justifying manner available. Then we 
develop a tunnel vision that impedes our ability to empathize and switch shoes with 
someone. Especially an enemy” (Liu 2009, loc. 1810).   
When someone experiences conflicting understandings of reality, their 
commonsense assumptions, which are formed according to the architecture of the cultural 
imaginary, suppress their capacity to experience the world otherwise; these assumptions 
tie them to the world as they know it and refuse to let them leave.  In this way, hegemony 
allows the dominant order to manipulate its subjects by making its existence appear 
natural, necessary and desirable where its specificity is rendered invisible, which compels 
the oppressed to make their cultural values congruent with their oppressors, which 
maintains the order without the use of force ; “dominant ideas tend to take on an 
appearance of naturalness and inevitability that renders them relatively impervious to 
critique” (Day 2005, p.46). 
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If one is seeking insight into the architecture of the hegemonic cultural imaginary3 
of the United States and the hegemonic cultural values are those of the dominant group, 
the must first determine who the dominant group is.  Modern societies generally consist 
of three primary modes of power; the market, civil-society, and the state (Wright 2010, 
p.119).   First, the market or economy “is the sphere of social activity in which people 
interact to produce and distribute goods and services” (Wright 2010, p.119).  Second, the 
state is the “effective capacity to impose rules and regulate social relations over territory, 
a capacity which depends on such things as information and communications 
infrastructure, the ideological commitments of citizens to obey rules and commands, the 
level of the regulations to solve problems, as well as the monopoly over the legitimate 
use of violence” (Wright 2010, p.119).  Finally, civil-society is the sphere of social 
interaction in which people voluntarily form associations with one another for for various 
purposes and whose specific form of power “…depends on capacities for collective 
action through voluntary association and can accordingly be referred to as “associational 
power” or “social power” (Wright 2010, p.120).   
The way these three spheres of power relate to one another determines how a 
society functions and the identity of the dominant group.  It is important to point out that 
these power relations are never absolute, but always exist in some sort of balance 
between the three spheres.  In other words, “while it is useful for analytical purposes to 
define “capitalism,” “statism,” and “socialism” as three qualitatively distinct types of 
economic structure, differentiated by the form of power that organizes economic activity, 
                                                 
3 The hegemonic cultural imaginary represents the dominant understanding of possibility in terms of what 
to value, how to honor those values, and how they imagine the world.  
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no concrete economic system is ever purely one or another of these forms” (Wright 2010, 
p.367).  For example, the liberal-democratic society4 is a configuration where those who 
control the market effectively dominate the other two spheres of power, 
while authoritarian statism exists where the state controls both the market and civil-
society.  However, if civil-society, or the common people, have power over both through 
democratic control, it inevitably leads to some form of socialism.   
This framework for conceptualizing power provides a simple overview of how 
influence is organized in liberal-democratic societies.   However, if any of these three 
spheres are conflated, it can lead to alternative ways of understanding power that are not 
consistent with reality, but can be used to conceal relations of domination through a 
mechanism of control that is embedded in the hegemonic cultural imaginary.  For 
example, while the state is often perceived as the primary source of social cohesion in 
modern liberal-democratic societies, it exists primarily for the purpose of allowing for the 
dominant group in the market to exercise legitimate violence over civil-society and 
against other states in order to protect their interests while creating a guise of formal 
equality among individuals where everyone is perceived to possess equal rights and 
democratic power.  In other words, the economic structures maintained through the state 
produce conditions where “socio-economic inequality and exploitation coexist with civic 
freedom and equality” (Wood 1995, p.201).  Because this system is necessary to maintain 
the hegemonic order, “it is crucial to liberal ideology that the transfer of individual 
                                                 
4 These are nation-states governed by representative assemblies who are elected through democratic 
processes in order to protect individual property rights. 
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autonomy to a coercive state apparatus be seen as based on consent, that it take the form 
of a ‘contract’ (Day 2005, p.53).   
The domination of civil-society by the state and the market is concealed by social 
contract theory, a creationist myth regarding the origins of the state.  It was produced 
with many variations by enlightenment thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes (1994), Jean 
Jacques Rousseau (1968), and John Locke (1980) in order to justify the conditions 
produced by the state and capitalism, which appear to be natural, necessary, and 
desirable.  According to this story, before the state first formed humanity existed in a 
state of nature, which was described as an environment where there is “continual fear and 
danger of violent death, and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” 
(Hobbes 1994, p. 76).  A realm, where there was no uninterested intermediary to resolve 
disputes between individuals.  In turn, according to human nature, which limited to 
rational self-interest, these individuals came together to form a contract; a written or  
spoken agreement  among  consenting  individuals  over  the  protection  or  
appropriation  of property, according to which these individuals “exchange[d] the 
insecurities of natural freedom for equal, civil freedom which is protected by the state” 
(Mills 1997, p.2).  By consenting to the formation of this social contract, the individuals’ 
willingly subjected themselves to the establishment of an official sovereignty; a source of 
legitimate authority designed to mediate disputes between them.  According to this 
agreement,  they  would leave  the  state  of  nature  and  cross  into a “civilized” society 
where they  pay  taxes  and  obey  laws  in  exchange  for  the  services  of  the  state.  
These  services  include  the  benefits  of  infrastructure  and  protection  (of  both  their 
  58   
bodies  and  property)  from  both  private  criminals  and  foreign  states  (Huemer  2013, 
p.20).    
In The Problem of Political Authority: An Examination of the Right to Coerce and 
the Duty to Obey, Michael Huemer (2013) argues that the absence of the necessary 
parameters to justify the legitimacy of the state based on either explicit or implicit 
consent, makes the validity of the relationship between the citizen and the state via 
contract invalid by its own definition.  The conditions necessary for a valid agreement 
include a reasonable means of refusal, the acknowledgment that explicit dissent 
undermines implicit consent, the recognition that contractual obligation is mutual and 
conditional, and the assumption that by dissenting to the agreement that the conditions 
will not be imposed on them anyway (Huemer 2013, p. 25-27).  In response to the first 
requirement for an agreement to be valid, there is no reasonable way of turning down an 
arrangement with the state and every piece of territory on earth is dominated by some 
form state power.  Other reasons might include the fact that one may not be able leave 
because of immigration restrictions, financial constraints, or refusing to give up personal 
relationships to family or friends (Huemer 2013, p. 27).   
The second requirement is the idea that the authority rooted in implicit consent 
can be overruled by explicit dissent.  If one is assumed to consent to the agreement, they 
should be able to nullify it by explicitly saying or writing that they do not consent.  
However, this is clearly not the case considering Anarchists, who reject the idea of 
government rule, are still subjected to the laws and taxes of the state (Huemer 2013, p. 
30).  The third requirement maintains that “an agreement is mutual and conditional” is 
challenged by social and historical realities.  Many would argue that the state does not 
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effectively provide protection from private criminals and foreign states and in fact, 
perpetuates conditions and attitudes that encourage violence and crime (Huemer 2013, p. 
31-35). The final requirement is that an agreement demands that the conditions will not 
be imposed on the individual regardless of whether they accept the agreement or not is 
very important, especially historically with regard to sex and race (Mills and Pateman 
2007).  There cannot be a proposed “agreement” if the results of the decision will be the 
same.  If an individual is free, equal, and acting on their own independent of coercion, 
threats, and “force,” in their decision to reject an agreement with the state, but they are 
still “forced” into subjection by the state than the “agreement” is no agreement at all, but 
domination.  For this reason, David Hume (1987, p.471) maintains that “almost all the 
governments, which exist at present, or of which there remains any record in story, have 
been founded originally, either on usurpation or conquest, or both, without any pretense 
of fair consent, or voluntary subjection of the people.” 
Despite these problems, in Contract and Domination, Charles Mills and Carole 
Pateman (2007, p.1) argue that “the simplicity and attractiveness of the idea of a “social 
contract” have made it an immensely powerful, influential, and long-enduring political 
concept, with an impact far beyond political theory.”  Critics of the social contract, often 
point to its capacity to conceal the state’s violent history of primitive accumulation and 
exploitation that it has maintained through its self-granted monopoly on violence that 
makes private property possible.  Max Haiven (2014, loc. 2406), refers to this type of 
suppression of history as “the policing of memory,” where the hegemonic order attempts 
to conform civil-society’s understanding of the past to “official histories which… 
…render the past as merely the unavoidable precedent of the inevitable present… …the 
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process by which the radical event is domesticated and defanged, held to have distinct 
and discrete causes and effects, and reduced to vignettes in the biography of individuals”  
In other words, policing of memory allows for the depoliticization of the past, producing 
a version that obscures the nature of the present by perpetuating the understanding that 
cause inequalities in wealth and power to appear as the natural result of human difference 
in order to maintain the legitimacy of those in authority.. 
When the social contract myth is conflated with historical reality, the state comes 
to be regarded as natural, necessary, and desirable in the dominant understanding of 
reality.  A reality where those societies which are organized around alternative values and 
imaginings are perceived as unnatural and as a result, the citizens of liberal-democratic 
states come to believe it is their duty to help “civilize” them by imposing the conditions 
of their own order onto others across space and time.  The pervasiveness of this attitude is 
evident throughout history when we consider the fact that in the minds of its creators, the 
“individuals” who would have formed the social contract had it been a real event, would 
have been white, male, property owners and that everyone outside of those social 
ascriptions, including women and people of color, would have only been considered only 
to have left the state of nature in relation to these individuals as subhumans.   
The social contract myth not only conceals how power functions in contemporary 
liberal-democratic societies, but also how difference was produced and treated 
historically by the state by compelling the reader to assume that each social group started 
the “race for power” under conditions of on equal footing with the same intentions; to 
dominate man and nature. This logic strengthens the dominant notion of social reality in 
contemporary capitalist society, which emphasizes individual accountability under formal 
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equality, where structurally disadvantaged both blame themselves and are blamed by 
others for their circumstances: “a sort of paranoid self-loathing that manifests as a 
loathing of the public, of convenient ‘others’, a sort of universal punitive judgmentalism 
rooted in one’s own feeling of eternal lack” (Haiven 2014, loc. 911).   
Part of maintaining this system consensually requires that the state provide 
welfare programs, labor unions, workplace safety requirements, trade barriers, 
environmental protections, etc. to civil-society in order to effectively reproduce a 
complicit labor force, maintain long term accumulation, and appear as a legitimate tool at 
the disposal of the polity.  These programs have the potential to protect the some of most 
vulnerable members of the society from being increasingly susceptible to exploitation by 
providing them access to resources that would otherwise be unavailable.  However, for 
those who are part of the order, but are not served by these programs because of their 
elite social status and seek to maximize their short-term profits by accessing new markets 
and keeping production costs down, these programs are detrimental according to their 
values; ones that equate tyranny with collectively establishing limits on the degree to 
which one can exploit their fellow man and the planet for the benefit of the individual.  
Therefore, in order to counteract these programs and regulations that are meant to protect 
society from the potential harms of the market, the neoliberal economists deploy the logic 
of social naturalism: “a way of organizing societal knowledge and perceptions around the 
schematic worldview that human society is subject to the same laws as of nature as the 
natural world… [which] ...reduces people to their biologically driven instincts and needs 
for food and reproduction” (Somers 2008, p. 52-53).   
  62   
The logic of social naturalism perpetuates the myth that there are simply not 
enough resources to meet everyone’s needs and that humanity is fundamentally 
constrained by the scarcity postulate, or “the constitutive and permanent condition of 
material scarcity,” which is used to justify the institution of private property, which is 
only to be acquired by the “naturally” superior members of society (Somers 2008, p. 53).  
It is for this reason that social naturalism “is not just an epistemological stance; it is also 
an ontology - a theory of being - in which the characteristics of the natural order are 
mapped onto and conflated with those of social order” (Somers 2008, p.52).  It 
effectively orientates its claimants behaviors and cultural imaginaries by reducing “the 
social world into those practices and entities that conform to the self-regulating laws of 
nature, and those that fall under the rubric of nonnatural phenomenon...” and then 
assigning “…epistemological privilege and ontological superiority [to] those entities 
deemed natural, such as the market, and demeans all that is deemed unnatural, such as the 
state” (Somers 2008, p.33).  From this perspective, the “secret to societal order and 
prosperity is to maintain at all costs this condition of scarcity, for only the biological 
drive to eat can discipline the social masses into the hunger-driven discipline to earn 
one’s keep” (Somers 2008, p.53).   
Rather than understanding society as three spheres of power, social naturalism 
produces a way of imagining power society as being split into two realms: the natural 
realm, which refers to the market, as well as the unnatural realm, which refers to the 
state.  In turn, economists can argue that state intervention, which is equated with the 
political power of civil-society through a system of representative democracy, in the 
market is “meddling with nature” and that “welfare relief will have perverse unintended 
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consequences of worsening the very problem it has was intended to solve” (Somers 2008, 
p.53).  In turn, this perspective acts as a means by which to justify the material 
deprivation of the majority, for if these tragedies did not exist, civil-society would fall 
apart because nobody would have an incentive to work and everything would fall into 
chaos.  This allows the capitalist class to justify the neoliberal agenda, where social 
welfare programs and the protection of common resources are dismantled and allocated 
towards security and the private sector to control the dissent that arises in response to the 
conditions it produces; where the order comes to be maintained through violent coercion 
whether than willful subjection in order to tighten the grip of capital upon its subjects.   
In order for a society to willingly grant power to a person or group, it requires that 
they make this relationship appear natural, necessary, and desirable under the 
circumstances as they are imagined in a particular time and space.  This is almost always 
accomplished by generating fear of a larger threat then making it appear as if only those 
seeking power have the capacity to protect the society from this danger.  In turn, the word 
“crisis,” “is deployed in number of situations to describe a complex, massive and 
overwhelming, unimaginable in scope problem that involves us all, but to which the 
solutions are entrusted to the powerful” (Haiven 2014 p.32).   
For liberal-democratic capitalist societies such as the United States, which is 
dominated by market power, this means generating a specific type of fear that relegates 
power to the market as the only solution.  Margaret Somers (2008, p.3) refers to the 
discourses that produce this type of understanding as crisis conversion narratives, which 
can here be understood as “fear inducing predictions intended to convert a culture’s 
dominant narratives from social to market precepts by foretelling the dire moral and 
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economic implications of continuing on the current social policy course” (Somers 2008, 
p.3).  This type of discourse functions by proposing “alternative understandings of 
reality, which aim to normalize and justify the market’s ever-increasing expansion into 
political, cultural, social, and civil sites once insulated from market penetration” and seek 
to “delegitimate once popular legislative agendas that embodied a modest acceptance of 
the social ethos of shared fate, equal risk, and social justice, as well as a commitment to 
redressing centuries of gender and racial exclusions” (Somers 2008, p.3).   
The disempowering, fear-based, interpretation of reality fashioned by crisis 
conversion narratives, such as social contract theory and social naturalism, enable the 
capitalist class to justify bending the will of the state5, in the favor allocating funding 
towards solidifying class relations while simultaneously abolishing the aspects that 
reduce profits (social welfare, trade barriers, public education, healthcare, environmental 
protection etc.) through increased taxes, regulations, and trade tariffs.  In turn, crisis 
conversion narratives make society vulnerable to “market fundamentalism,” or “the drive 
to subject all of social life and the public sphere to market mechanisms” (Somers 2008, 
p.2).  This drive towards market dominance displaces the state as the sphere of 
negotiation between civil-society and the market and in effect subjects the state to the 
market, leaving civil-society vulnerable to its power, as is articulated by Margaret Somers 
(2008, p.40): 
under market fundamentalism the institutions of the state are conquered by 
powers constituted in the economic sphere that have crossed the boundary into the 
polity, where market power is illegitimately exercised.  The extension of market 
                                                 
5 Keep in mind the conflation of the state and civil-society into the public realm 
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principles into the polity transforms it into a market-driven state.  The ethic of 
contract displaces that of the social state, and translates the relationship between 
citizen and state into one of contractual quid pro quo conditionality.  In that 
conversion the state’s mediating position between citizens and market is 
dissolved. 
 
The market is taken for granted as the dominant sphere of power in the United 
States because the dominant understanding of power is shaped by the social contract, 
scarcity postulate, social naturalism, and market fundamentalism, which reduces the three 
spheres of power into just two: the public and the private.  While the public realm 
represents the power relationships maintained by the state6, the private sector contains 
both the relationships produced by the market and civil-society and in turn, their values 
are conflated.  In other words, understanding power in the United States as a dichotomy 
between the public and the private obliges people to see interests of the market and civil-
society as one and the same, despite the fact that it only benefits the status quo.  As such, 
the inequalities in wealth and power produced by capitalism are portrayed as unavoidable 
truths that are the result of human specificity, where starting from an equal position at the 
formation of the social contract, the naturally superior individuals have risen to the top of 
the social ladder due to possessing superior values than the rest of society.   
Because market values appear to be objectively superior to alternatives, “to be 
successful in the present order is to somehow synchronize the reproduction of capital 
with the reproduction of our individual lives” by maximizing our levels of accumulation 
                                                 
6 Theoretically, the state operates according to the will of civil-society through procedural-representative 
democracy. 
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and consumption (Haiven 2014, p.111).  As a result, it appears that those who have 
achieved “success” according to the dominant notion of the social order, have done so by 
embracing the values of the market and in turn, it is natural, necessary, and desirable to 
do so within the given order, which is understood as the only possible way of organizing 
human relations.  While this is a creative notion, it fails to take into account the fact that 
“the ability to accumulate and overconsume resources is a reproductive advantage only in 
a society where resources are not equitably shared” and for societies that are structured 
socially and culturally to prevent extreme stratification in wealth and power, it is 
pointless to overconsume or overproduce (Eisenstein 2004, p.368).  In fact, when one 
considers the biocidal effects capitalism has had on the planet’s ecosystem in just a short 
time, maintain this hegemonic notion of success functions as the conscious and 
inevitable, suicide of man.  This reflects Somer’s (2008, p,41) assertion that as our 
activity has become increasingly subject to market fundamentalism, there has been a 
“shift in the dominant knowledge culture from a social problems approach that valorizes 
the common good, to economics and market model of human organization” (Somers 
2008, p.41).   
The drive towards society’s complete subjection to the market not only makes 
civil-society increasingly vulnerable to the will of private individuals, but necessitates the 
conversion of activities people used to do for themselves or got for free into 
commodities, which in order for them to have access to, must sell their labor for wages or 
extract surplus value from labor of others for profit (Marx 1992).  This is due to the fact 
that as the dominant sphere of power in liberal-democratic societies, the market, uses the 
state as an instrument of domination to appropriate what was once common, converting it 
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to private property which is protected through the exercise of legitimate violence.  In 
turn, what was once common becomes subject to the power of the market, which decides 
who has access to what in a rather undemocratic way; by converting the commons into 
universal value for the purpose of profitmaking; “money is the corpse of the commons, 
the embodiment of all that was once common and free, turned now into property of the 
purest form” (Eisenstein 2004, p.68).   
As universal value is accumulated in the hands of fewer and fewer people, it 
allows them to gain exclusive access to more of the commons, which can be transformed 
through exploited labor in order to produce more value, and the people of civil-society 
are increasingly denied access to the resources necessary for alternative modes of 
production.  In other words, as more aspects of people’s lives become commodified 
(including access to food, housing, education, and healthcare), in order to access them 
people must compete with others to acquire universal value to be exchanged for these 
goods and services they once produced for themselves because there is no alternative due 
to the fact that majority do not have the means to defend or gain access to the commons 
in the presence of the state and its monopoly on violence (Eisenstein 2011).  In this way, 
the institution of private property effectively maintains conditions where people are 
forced to sell their labor to property owners so that its value can be appropriated because 
they have no other way to gain access to what they need to survive.   
When one considers the power over life and death granted by capitalist relations 
maintained through the state, it becomes clear that such conditions were never reached 
consensually, but rather they reflect Kropotkin’s (2011, p.190) claim that “wagedom was 
not instituted to remove the disadvantages of communism; its origin, like that of the State 
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and private ownership, is to be found elsewhere. It is born of slavery and serfdom 
imposed by force, and only wears a more modern garb.”  Any attempts to reverse the 
process of privatization are suppressed by state’s monopoly on violence or its legal 
apparatus and the subversives branded as dangerous political radicals.  In turn, civil-
society is subjected to the market and state, producing an order where the majority is 
exploited by both spheres of power as the means to survive in an alternative system are 
simultaneously denied and subverted.   
Because private property is maintained under the threat of state violence, the only 
way to access the commons for the vast majority of people is to acquire it through the 
exchange of universal currency that is only to be acquired by going into debt and/or 
participating in abstract labor, which is a mechanism and relationship for the purpose of 
appropriating “surplus value” from the unpaid efforts of the producers, who have no 
control over the product of their labor: 
along with the useful qualities of the products themselves, we put out of sight 
both the useful character of the various kinds of labour embodied in them, and the 
concrete forms of that labour; there is nothing left but what is common to them 
all; all are reduced to one and the same sort of labour, human labour in the 
abstract… The labour.... that forms the substance of value is homogenous labour, 
expenditure of one uniform labour power. (Marx 1867/1965, p.38-39)(Marx 
1867/1990, p.128-132).   
 
As civil-society is increasingly forced to participate in abstract labor where their 
activity is not their own and they have no control over the product, in order to survive, 
their activity becomes but a means to an ends; instrumental domination that directs 
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collective effort towards serving the interests of the status quo in more and more aspects 
of American’s lives.  In other words, most of their activity becomes devoid of all 
meaning and time becomes universal, one minute just as valuable as the next, as they are 
subjected to labor to produce surplus values to be appropriated and relegated to idling 
property owners who hide behind the state and its massive security apparatus.  One might 
spend twelve hours a day for 30 years making plastic packaging for cheese snacks, but 
they could have been making rat poison, or assembling sex toys; it no longer matters 
what the activity a person carries out.  In addition to being bound to the system, our 
exploitation which produces surplus-value, will inevitably be used to expand the system 
into new markets and to subject new populations to the system of abstract labor.  As a 
result, those subject to abstract labor contribute to the process of capitalist globalization, 
which incessantly closes off spaces where people can live in ways that operate 
independently of the logic of capital by which it reproduces itself.   
When people trade living for working, meaningful activity for abstract labor, their 
activity becomes instrumentalized and so do their values7 and imaginations, resulting in 
what Max Haiven (2014, loc. 1727) refers to as the financialized imagination, which 
“encourages us to understand the future and act in the present based on the short-term 
calculation of risk and the individual maximization of monetary benefit.”  Such an 
orientation reduces how humans behave and the way they relate to one another and the 
planet, to a means to an ends.  In this way, “abstract labor is the basis of instrumental 
reason… ...in which truth has meaning only as a measurement of the effectiveness of 
                                                 
7 Having the social relations of abstract labor imposed on civil-society compels its participants to 
appropriate the hegemonic values of the order. 
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means to achieve an end, in which people themselves come to be seen simply as a means 
to an end” (Holloway 2010, p.147). 
It is due to the capacity of abstract labor to instrumentalize the logic and 
behaviors of its participants that Pheng Cheah contends in Inhuman Conditions (2006, 
p.6), that “instrumental or technical reason, which is the essence of scientific knowledge 
and material progress, is synonymous with power.  What human beings seek to learn 
from nature is how to use it to dominate wholly both it and human beings.  Nothing else 
counts.”  In this way, science has always been about the domination of nature and man; in 
the case of abstract labor, it is the conquering of man by man for the purposes of 
exploitation.  Because what is understood as “truth” is limited to instrumental reasoning, 
it has implications in terms of how people can understand the world and social change.  
In this way, capitalism is not just an economic system, but rather: 
 a system for conscripting our imagination and our action. It succeeds and thrives 
to the extent that it informs what we believe is valuable, and compels us to act in 
the world on the basis of those values. Or at least it works to the extent that it so 
perverts and confuses our sense of value that we fail to recognize its inherent 
pathology and so fail to demand collectively something very different. (Haiven 
2014, loc. 826) 
 
Because these relations are taken for granted as natural, necessary, and desirable, 
improving one’s condition only appears possible within the confines of the established 
order.  Therefore, if the order which reproduces instrumental domination is maintained 
through the state and market and the utopian is that which breaks through the existing 
order; the utopian in the hegemonic cultural imaginary of the United States is the 
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empowerment of civil-society to act in their own interests with regard to their desires, 
fantasies, and how they choose to manifest their dreams in reality, rather than those 
ascribed to them. 
The hegemonic understanding of justice that results from the oppressed 
appropriating the cultural imaginary of the oppressor has numerous implications for the 
utopian vision it creates and the possibilities it permits.  In the first dimension, the fascist 
utopian impulse, desire is equated with maintaining the established order because the 
interests of civil-society are congruent to those of the dominant class that benefits from 
the existing order.  This occurs because in the hegemonic cultural imaginary produces an 
understanding of the world where the three realms of power (state, market, civil-society) 
in the United States are reduced to only two; the public and private.  A world where the 
state maintains fair, equal, and just conditions and where those who possess superior 
values are able to rise to the top and be successful according to the hegemonic notion of 
maximizing one’s accumulation and consumption of value.   In other words, those subject 
to the present order are compelled to appropriate the values of their oppressors because 
they believe their status as such to be legitimately acquired through individual effort and 
that embodying their values will allow them to be successful as well, which is never 
threatening to the status quo and can never produce a sense of justice that includes 
everyone and recognizes difference.  This form of the utopian impulse is responsible for 
making “that which breaks the existing order” appear unnatural, unnecessary, and 
undesirable.  For this reason, the hegemonic cultural imaginary limits possibility so as to 
make the utopian impulse impotent as a tool for social and political justice. 
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 In the second dimension of utopia, or the fascist utopian imaginary; where the 
claimant of a utopian vision imagines a better world and how to achieve it.  For those 
operating from the hegemonic cultural imaginary,8 the vision a better world is either left 
up to the claimant’s ability to succeed within the established order as an individual 
competing in the market or the responsibility is relegated to the state to uphold the order 
through the law, which is equated with justice.  This is problematic if you consider what 
was discussed earlier; while the state appears to serve the interests of the majority 
through representative democracy and the maintenance of formal equality for the benefit 
of all of civil-society, it is subject to the financial elite who truly benefit from it and in 
turn, the prospect of building a future based on principles of justice is relegated to those 
who benefit from the current one; like asking the local butcher to encourage his 
customers to go vegan.  Because the hegemonic cultural imaginary generates fascist 
assumptions about political-economic reality and human nature through the perpetuation 
of creationist myths, it not only constrains the possibility of imagining alternatives that 
exist outside of this framework as possible, but prevents us from being able to imagine 
functional alternatives at all. 
Finally, in the hegemonic cultural imaginary of the United States, the sense of 
justice that is produced is responsible for the manifestation of the fascist utopian form.  
One that equates law with justice and in turn and never breaks the existing order, but 
simply maintains or transforms the conditions that uphold its hierarchical relations rooted 
in fascist assumptions regarding the fundamental nature of humanity and its relationship 
                                                 
8 The fascist cultural imaginary of the United States exists as the process occurring due to the dialectical 
relationship between market values and the financialized imagination. 
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to the natural world.  Because justice is conflated with the law, it is abstracted from the 
responsibility of civil-society, which understands the state as an unbiased mediator 
between individuals as per the social contract, consisting of individuals who were freely 
elected to represent its interests and in turn, issues of justice are always conducted 
through the vehicles the state provides.  This includes activities like following the law for 
its own sake, paying taxes, serving in the military or police force, participating in 
peaceful and legal methods of social change like voting or writing letters to politicians, 
and always supporting the decisions made by state officials.  At the same time, the fascist 
utopian form also includes fascist movements whose ideological frameworks are 
congruent with the taken for granted assumptions that are embedded in the cultural 
imaginary, especially those relating to race, gender, and religion, such as the Patriot 
Guard, men’s rights activists, and radical Christian extremism, which are never repressed 
to the degree that heretical movements are because they reinforce the structures that 
maintain the established order.  The utopian form is never a threat to the status quo, but 
creates the illusion that civil-society is in control of its own fate through fair and 
democratic processes when in reality, it is just spinning its wheels and digging itself into 
a deeper hole.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The rules of social life which they learn and internalize as they grow up seem 
natural.  People are preoccupied with the tasks of daily life, with making a living, 
with coping with life’s pains and enjoying life’s pleasures.  The idea that the 
social world could be deliberately changed in some fundamental way that would 
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make life significantly better for most people seems pretty far-fetched, both 
because it is hard to imagine some dramatically better workable alternative and 
because it is hard to imagine how to successfully challenge existing institutions of 
power privilege in order to create such an alternative.  Thus, even if one accepts 
the diagnosis and critique of existing social institutions, the most natural response 
for most people is probably a fatalistic sense that there is not much that could be 
done to really change things. (Wright 2010, p.24) 
 
In this passage, Erik Olin Wright explains how features of the architecture of the 
hegemonic cultural imaginary of the United States are taken for granted as truth and as a 
result, cause social change beyond the established order to appear as the “merely 
utopian.”  As I explained at the beginning of chapter 2, such an orientation produces a 
sense of justice that conceals the fact that it privileges white, male, property owners who 
acquired their power through the brutal appropriation of the commons and the 
suppression of alternatives to abstract labor through the enforcement of the law and the 
use of violence against groups whose ways of knowing and being contradict their own 
(Pateman and Mills 2007)(Holloway 2010).  In other words, the architecture of the fear-
based hegemonic cultural imaginary leads to the widespread abandonment of possibility 
of alternatives within the given order, shapes a person’s sense of justice and who is 
included according to the what they think is important, how they can get there, and the 
way they imagine the world.  This is due to the fact that the ideological mechanisms of 
control that limit the number of perspectives from which someone can interpret the world 
makes them vulnerable to manipulation by others and compels them to grant authority to 
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a specific group or individual; constraining possibility by producing a vision of the world 
that subjects their behaviors, attitudes, and rationales to instrumental reasoning.   
Both the social order’s capacity to exact violence on its subjects and effectively 
embed the hegemonic mechanisms of control and fascist assumptions within their 
cultural imaginary serve as powerful barriers to challenging the existing order and in turn, 
building a more just world.  However, in chapter 3 I will begin the second step of 
emancipatory social science and attempt to emancipate the cultural imaginary from its 
hegemonic constraints in order to make room for freedom and possibility so that it can be 
applied to material reality through individual and collective agency.  If the hegemonic 
vision of success in the United States is engineered to maintain the reproduction of 
liberal-capitalist order, I will attempt to explore a cultural imaginary that could be 
responsible for failure. Therefore, in chapter 3 I will demonstrate how low theory can be 
deployed to produce a cultural imaginary where civil-society can create its own notion of 
success according to the experience of living with one another in solidarity and in turn, be 
compelled to break the conditions of the established order in an attempt to build another 
world.  In other words, this counter-hegemonic cultural imaginary is heretical and 
utopian; where human difference is permitted to exist in terms of its desires, imaginings, 
and ways of being.  
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CHAPTER 3 
UTOPIA AND THE HERETICAL CULTURAL IMAGINARY 
Heresy and Failure 
 
The capacity to understand the world from the perspectives offered by unfamiliar 
cultural imaginaries not only allows people to comprehend other people’s ways of 
knowing and being, but it also gives them to the ability to pick and choose which 
meanings they choose to ascribe to the world based upon their experience of living in it 
with other people.  For those who refuse to vacate the nest of absurd certainty, but instead 
remain the comfort of a universal illusion offered by a group seeking authority, the world 
appears small and frightening.   However, for those who find a way to move beyond the 
rigid architecture of their cultural imaginary to confront reality and refuse to stop moving 
forward even after consciously accepting the limitations of their current worldview, the 
world is boundless and offers us hope for alternatives.  In this way, heretics are pioneers 
of the imagination: those who dive into the void of possibility, unsure where they will 
land, but certain it will be in a place where there is room to grow.   
Heretics understand the necessity cultivating the imagination and recognize the 
value of learning to use different perspectives across various points in time and space, 
depending upon which is the most useful.  This type of imaginary is essential for 
freedom, because it offers one the capacity to compare the validity of multiple 
perspectives according to their experience of living in the world, rather than to blindly 
accept the claims of predatory social actors and groups attempting to make their authority 
appear natural, necessary, and desirable for the purposes of instrumentalizing the rest of 
society to serve their agenda. 
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When someone is subjected to the ways of knowing and being in the world that 
serve the interests of hegemonic groups, the assumptions that shape the architecture of 
the cultural imaginary will disrupt their capacity to look beyond them and in turn, the 
person’s ability to understand social relationships is inhibited.  When they can no longer 
look beyond their commonsense understanding of the world, they fail to see how power 
operates outside of this framework.  In other words, these structuring effects designate 
the “limit of of permissible truth” and produce a cultural imaginary that exists exclusively 
to serve the practical (Gordon 2004, p.122).  The practical being, the spectrum of 
possible positions and acceptable arguments in political discussions within a particular 
order.  In this way, the limit of permissible truth represents the deliberate ignorance of 
real possibilities and is fundamentally anti-utopian.  Therefore, in order to emancipate 
utopian, one must gain the capacity to look beyond “truth” to become what Ursula Le 
Guin calls “a realist of a larger reality,” where people learn to collectively decide what is 
possible through the experience of living with one another (National Book, 2014).  To 
accomplish this task, those who are interested in social and political justice need utopia 
because when we don’t know what we’re trying to do we can’t even begin to do it. 
If someone desires to emancipate the cultural imaginary from the imprisonment of 
practicality ascribed by the dominant group, they need to look alternatives to the 
commonsense aspects of it that are responsible for reproducing the relations necessary for 
order.  At the same time, they need to be careful not to simply establish another set of 
fixed assumptions that will place them in the same situation. Therefore, to accomplish 
this task I will deploy a methodology that Judith Halberstam refers to as low theory in 
The Queer Art of Failure (2011).  Whereas most emancipatory methodologies will 
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reproduce “hierarchies of knowing that maintain the high in high theory” (Halberstam 
2011, p.16), low theory “makes peace with the possibility that alternatives dwell in the 
murky waters of a counterintuitive, often impossibly dark and negative realm of critique 
and refusal” (Halberstam 2011, p.2).  Rather than being bound to explore possibility in 
the world through a framework that only allows certain truths to exist  as such as a result 
of the understanding of the world that is bound by hegemonic assumptions regarding 
success, winning, remembering, making, doing, and becoming, low theory considers the 
fact that “under certain circumstances, failing, losing, forgetting, unmaking, undoing, 
unbecoming, not knowing may in fact offer more creative, more cooperative, more 
surprising ways of being in the world” (Halberstam 2011, p.2).  \ 
Low theory is particularly useful for emancipating utopian possibilities because 
rather than being subject to the practical and successful according to the hegemonic 
cultural imaginary; it allows for that which is understood as impractical or unsuccessful 
to exist as a path towards a more politically and socially just society.   If one is to break 
the bonds of the existing order and make room for alternatives, they must have the 
capacity to move beyond the limits of permissible truth designated by the architecture of 
the hegemonic cultural imaginary and attempt to determine what values and political-
economic imaginaries are born of the instinct for freedom.  In other words, if a person 
wants self-determination in their lives in the present, they must first learn how to live 
with one another in the absence of instrumentality.   
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The Heretical Cultural Imaginary 
 
Low theory allows us to explore the emancipatory potentials of failing to meet the 
dominant notion of success according to the hegemonic cultural imaginary in the United 
States.  However, in order to ensure that one can avoid constructing another form of 
systemic domination, their values must be linked to resistance.  In other words, civil-
society must develop and embody alternative meanings and symbols that reflect human 
difference across space and time in order to combat the establishment of hegemonic 
values.  A world that values self-determination requires that one’s value system and the 
political-economic imagination be heretical and unbound by dogmatisms that close off 
real possibility because it require a cultural imaginary that will incessantly and effectively 
shatter hegemonic understanding of the existing order so that instrumentality can never 
become taken for granted as truth.   
If the hegemonic notion of success requires that one align their cultural values 
with market principles to maximize individual accumulation and consumption leading to 
the reproduction of the liberal-democratic capitalist order, the heretic should learn to 
embrace failure.  Failure, in this case would be to free oneself of the instrumental 
domination maintained through abstract labor and the hegemonic cultural imaginary that 
maintain the existing order.  In turn, it requires the capacity to imagine a world beyond 
the state and abstract labor, which produces “a system of social cohesion… …that has as 
its core a relation of exploitation, the production of surplus value” and into realms of self-
determination and meaningful activity where the producers have control over the 
products of their labor (Holloway 2010, p.149).  In this way “the real determinant of 
society is hidden behind the state and the economy: it is the way in which our everyday 
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activity is organised, the subordination of our doing to the dictates of abstract labour, that 
is, of value, money, profit” (Holloway 2010, p.133). 
Whereas abstract labor is a specific type of social relationship that 
instrumentalizes one’s behaviors, values, and imaginations, concrete labor refers to “a 
necessary condition, independent of all forms of society, for the existence of the human 
race; it is an eternal nature-imposed necessity, without which there can be no material 
exchanges between man and Nature, and therefore no life” (Holloway 2010. p.90).  In 
other words, unlike abstract labor, concrete labor or use labor is “productive activity of a 
definite kind and exercised with a definite aim” that “produces use-values, things that are 
useful” as opposed to things that simply function as surrogates of the surplus value 
appropriated from the exploited workers that can be exchanged for universal value on the 
market required to reproduce or expand the given order (Holloway 2010, p.90).  Concrete 
labor does not imply any specific production system, but it requires that the activity take 
place under democratic conditions based upon free association.  In turn, useful activity as 
a mode of production necessitates the emancipation of the commons and the rejection of 
private property as natural, necessary, and desirable; the negation of the social contract as 
a structuring of the imagination, where the brutal appropriation of land and peoples of 
North America by Europeans as the origin of the state is concealed by the veil of liberal 
objectivity and blind individualism (Smith 2005).    
The end of the social contract requires the dissolution of social naturalism; the 
imaginary framework of objectively determined categories and rankings, or natural 
hierarchy used to comprehend human difference and rationalize the subjection of the 
many to the few.  This rationalization is the product of reducing a much more complex 
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social reality to a juxtaposition of characteristics composed from the detached eyes of a 
small group of white men who feel compelled by the way they understand the world to 
conquer both nature and man.  A belief system that attempts to excuse psychopathy by 
reducing human nature to rational self-interest; a logic that denies social justice so 
vigilantly to the majority that liberty could be equated with slavery.   
If this system of categories and rankings is understood as truth, an objective 
comprehension of human difference, low theory holds that the alternative understanding 
is derived from untruth and unknowing; a state that can be arrived at from anywhere 
groups of people establish from the experience of living with one another as complex, 
dynamic, and self-determinant beings.  Therefore, the cultural imaginary I am attempting 
to uncover must value the capacity for difference to define itself as such through direct 
democracy.  Rather than trading one’s self-determination for security by relegating power 
to a source of authority to represent their interests from a framework that attempts to 
dehumanize the unfamiliar as is the case with representative democracy, direct 
democracy allocates power directly and specifically to the people subject to the 
consequences of the decision to be made.  
Capitalist relations represent a system designed to maximize the efficiency at 
which value can be pilfered by its most successful and privileged participants.  In this 
way, every participant in abstract labor is subject to it; compelled by both necessity and 
desire to participate in abstract labor in order to survive and make a life for themselves 
despite the incessant encroachment of the market into their lives.  Market 
fundamentalism produces conditions where human relationships are abstracted from 
meaning and we come to only relate to people through things.  The cold exchange of 
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universal value that takes place in impersonal conditions and bears no future obligations 
effectively destroying communities and alternative modes of production that allow for 
autonomy and self-determination and produce where humans are in constant competition 
for never enough; where human nature is reduced to rational self-interest (Eisenstein 
2011).  When we apply low theory, the counterintuitive reveals that the cultural 
imaginary must reflect mutual aid, free association, and concrete labor which allow for 
the reciprocal exchange of goods and services in ways that tie people’s fates together and 
build solidarity and democracy as opposed to the alienation and hierarchy of abstract 
labor relations.  A system built on mutual aid values the reciprocal exchange of resources 
and services for the purposes of meeting everyone’s needs and is never understood 
something that is unchangeable or that needs to be imposed upon others, but instead is 
radically democratic and dynamic; constantly evolving alongside the changes taking 
place in political and economic reality. 
 By using low theory to explore the hegemonic cultural imaginary of the United 
States, I have uncovered utopian possibilities that challenge the logic of the status quo 
and outline how a heretic in the United States might attempt to organize their 
relationships with others to build another world.  In this way, a form of utopia has been 
revealed that is derived from a sense of justice that includes everyone due to the 
capability of the heretical cultural imaginary to provide increased self-determination in 
terms of what a person thinks is important, how they intend to get there, and the way they 
imagine the world.  If the hegemonic cultural imaginary exists as the dialectical 
relationship between market values and the financialized imagination, the architecture of 
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the heretical cultural imaginary is structured by the dialectical relationship between 
cultures of resistance and the radical imagination.   
Why “cultures” of resistance?  Because we who are subject to the order often 
have only that in common.  In other words, while each group may oppose the types of 
relationships imposed by the hegemonic order, we do so for different reasons and with 
hope for the manifestation of dissimilar utopian worlds in mind.  This is due to the fact 
that our social identities and the histories attached to them are heterogenous and only 
these groups and individuals can know what is best for them.  For example, as Lisa M. 
Poupart (2003, p.87) points out, “over five hundred years of social, political, and 
economic domination, Western society [has] enforced its cultural codes of otherness upon 
American Indians to gain our complicity in the power structure.”  Therefore, the 
decolonization of indigenous peoples as it occurs in the in the realms of ideology, social 
structure, and spirituality is dependent upon the displacement of this “otherness,” by 
reinforcing traditional epistemologies as a cognizant strategy or aspect of direct cultural 
revitalization praxis.  Therefore, the decolonization of indigenous peoples as it occurs in 
the in the realms of ideology, social structure, and spirituality is dependent upon the 
displacement of this “otherness,” by reinforcing traditional epistemologies as a cognizant 
strategy or aspect of direct cultural revitalization praxis. 
Michelle M. Jacob describes the invaluable ethnomethodological function of 
teaching traditional dances across generations in indigenous societies when she asserts in 
Yakama Rising: Indigenous Cultural Revitalization, Activism, and Healing (2013, Loc. 
541) that: “dances accomplish several important functions.  They affirm the importance 
of the oral histories and traditional cultural lessons that the elders teach; they affirm the 
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importance of the girls who are dedicated to learning these lessons and carrying on the 
traditions.  They affirm the importance of the audiences, who witness and honor the girls 
and the traditions. And at a fundamental level, the dances teach – they instruct – Yakama 
peoples how to live and what should be valued.”  In other words, the act of teaching and 
performing these dances becomes an act of resistance and contributes to the 
decolonization of native peoples in its various realms (mentioned above).  As a vehicle 
for decolonization, teaching traditional dance strengthens intergenerational bonds that 
promote indigenous understandings of symbiotic interconnectedness and provides an 
appropriate context and practical method for passing on cultural lessons and oral 
histories.  This is essential to the decolonization process considering that “indigenous 
resistance is inherently intergenerational. Without the guidance of elders, younger 
generations will not have a pathway to follow.  These intergenerational connections are 
important for all aspects of culture, and especially so for language, due to the 
predominance of the English language among American Indian children, families, 
schools, and broader US society” (Jacob 2013, loc. 1060).   
This form of resistance also challenges Western values regarding gender roles by 
placing the girls in a position of respect.  Because the practice affirms the importance of 
the women in native societies and simultaneously challenges western patriarchal values, 
it has implications for decolonization in all three realms.  Addressing patriarchy is 
especially essential to indigenous decolonization because “as Andrea Smith articulates, 
colonizers naturalized hierarchy by instituting patriarchy,” so by displacing patriarchy, 
indigenous peoples are simultaneously displacing the hierarchical ideologies and 
structures that were forced upon them and have contributed to the erasure of their 
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traditional ways of knowing and being (as cited in Jacob 2013, loc. 1765).   This applies 
not just to how the girls that are participating in these ceremonies conceptualize the ways 
they relate to one another and their society, but also the ways in which the members of 
the audience come to understand this relationship.  During these events, the members of 
the audience are invited to participate in intergenerational knowledge sharing and 
relationship building, where the act of passing on and performing traditional native dance 
(both the individual dances and the practice in general), shape the epistemologies of 
everyone involved so that they can more accurately reflect traditional native values. 
It is important to note that while these practices are effective for this particular 
group it is because they are specifically congruent with the participant’s heretical cultural 
imaginaries.  However, they would not serve the interests of another group, such as 
African-Americans Los Angeles seeking solutions to the gang violence and police 
repression that plagues in their communities.  In this way, accounting for human 
difference is important, but at the same time, one must always remember that the 
deliverance of a single group is never sufficient and that the true potentials for 
emancipation lie in solidarity with others.   
Heretics may be shaped individually by their distinct combinations of oppression, 
but from a radical perspective all heretics exist as such because of the sense of justice 
produced by the fascist cultural imaginary that attempts to categorize and rank human 
difference while simultaneously concealing the brutal origins of contemporary social 
reality.  Because one’s political-economic imagination is shaped by their cultural values, 
they are subject to the taken-for-granted limitations of the established order.  However, if 
they can think and behave according to social values that they establish from the 
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experience of living with people in different ways, they can change what is possible, 
which is essential for getting momentum behind alternative strategies: “how we imagine 
social relations and the possibilities for change will shape what sorts of broad strategies 
we believe might be effective” (Haiven 2014, p.230).  In other words, by expanding one’s 
cultural imaginary through the process of building relationships and tying their fates to 
those of other people, they gain the capacity to comprehend as possible alternative forms 
of social relations that do not serve the status quo.  In this way, ”imagination is an 
intimate part of how we empathize with others, the way we gain some sense of the forces 
that impact our lives, and the way we project ourselves into the future and gain 
inspiration and direction from the past” (Haiven 2014, p.4).    
Human emancipation is something that is never finished and must never be if we 
are seeking justice for everyone, for if the cultural imaginary had an end it would cease to 
splinter the restraints ascribed by established order and in effect become what it was 
attempting to destroy.  It is for this reason that “the politics of the imagination can’t just 
be about imagining universal, one-size-fits-all alternatives to the current order.  It must be 
about working ‘transversally’ to bridge our imaginations and create common imaginaries 
of the way the world might be” (Haiven 2014, loc. 3295).  The radical imagination is 
never universal or static, but always specific and dynamic, making it both fundamentally 
utopian and anti-fascist.  At the same time, it is something that takes place in the 
individual, group, and collectivity of heretics.  While specific frameworks of thought 
such as the Black Radical Imagination (Kelly, 2002), Feminist Radical Imagination 
(Bell, 2000), and Green Radical Imagination (Weston, 2012) represent the specific 
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interests of various groups, they all share a heretical imaginary landscape that opposes the 
power relations imposed by the established order. 
The perpetually-unfinished process of building solidarity provides different 
groups the opportunity to look at the value of alternative social relationships, 
epistemologies, and ontologies that challenge the “truths” inherent to the hegemonic 
cultural imaginary: “the expansion of the imagination is the work of solidarity, and 
solidarity is, in part, a broadening of the imagination” (Haiven 2014, p.24).  Because 
people share their imaginations with those around them, sharing experiences with people 
who operate from alternative cultural imaginaries in spaces that reflect them has the 
potential to emancipate their cultural imaginaries from the one that maintains the existing 
order through the reproduction of capital and the state.  In turn, the radical imagination, 
or the “collective process of developing alternative modes of reproducing ourselves as 
social beings” (Haiven 2014, loc. 302) “emerges from the experience of ‘acting 
otherwise’, from the friction between one’s values and the reigning paradigm of value, 
and from the process of building alternatives” (Haiven 2014, loc. 302).  The friction 
between the hegemonic political-economic and the radical one, draws out the 
contradictions present in the way one understands the world and the way they experience 
it.   
The heretical cultural imaginary, or the process formed according to the 
dialectical relationship between our cultures of resistance and the radical imagination, is 
one that allows for human difference to exist as such, because it produces a sense of 
justice that values all human life.  It is primarily for this reason that a heretic’s utopian 
vision looks much different than that of the fascist.  In the first dimension, the utopian 
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impulse, heretics desire social and political justice; where all people not only have access 
to the material and social means necessary to live flourishing lives, but they can 
participate in collective decisions that affect their lives.  In turn, the heretical utopian 
impulse is simultaneously contains both the instinct for freedom and the instinct for 
solidarity.  It contains the instinct for freedom because it never waits for the authorization 
of the established order to take action and the instinct for solidarity because it is 
congruent with one’s conscience, without which, justice is but a formality. In Mutual Aid 
(1902, p.5), Petr Kropotkin explains the relationship between conscience and instinct for 
solidarity: 
 
Love, sympathy, and self-sacrifice certainly play an immense part in the 
progressive development of our moral feelings.  But it is not love and not even 
sympathy upon which Society is based in mankind.  It is the conscience—be it 
only at the stage of instinct—of human solidarity.  It is the unconscious 
recognition of the force that is borrowed by each man from the practice of mutual 
aid; of the close dependency of every one’s happiness upon the happiness of all; 
and the sense of justice, or equity, which brings the individual to consider the 
rights of every other individual as equal to his own.   
 
 
Kropotkin’s words reflect how a sense of social and political justice that includes 
everyone and accounts for difference across time, space, gender, ability, and culture 
requires a cultural imaginary that values the instinct for solidarity.  Because of the 
artificial scarcity produced by capitalism throws civil-society into competition with one 
another for survival, it is only when the principle of mutual aid is embodied in different 
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ways of knowing and being that difference will be free to exist as such independently of 
the established order. 
The heretical utopian imaginary envisions various ways of meeting the needs of 
both the instincts that make up the heretical utopian impulse; they authorize agency in the 
present and they compel symbiotic mutuality between its claimants.  However, another 
factor to consider is that the heretical utopian imaginary, if it is to be taken seriously, 
must be congruent with the limits of one’s conscience.  In other words, if a person is not 
willing to cross a particular moral barrier that would inevitably come up from following a 
certain path towards self-determination, they should never start on it.  Taking this into 
consideration, the most obvious paths that remain are either those that have been paved 
by the state and end up just circling back around, despite the illusion of progress.  All that 
remains are forbidden paths that look dangerous or impossible.  One might say that to 
follow them without being forced to would be counterintuitive and stupid, probably 
ending in a pit of snakes or a dead end.  However, the heretic knows that lasting change 
always occurs when people choose to pave new routes themselves alongside their 
communities to begin the journey to reach another world together.  The heretical utopian 
imaginary never constructs a set of relations that it is understood as universally 
appropriate, nor one that must be imposed upon others, but embodies democratic values 
and permits human difference and autonomy across space and time. 
In the third dimension lies the heretical utopian form, where one attempts to 
manifest their utopian imaginary in reality according to the nature of their utopian 
impulse and the resources that are available.  If the utopian form is the “utopian impulse 
detectable in daily life” as per Jameson (2004, p.1), its heretical variety is what it looks 
  90   
like to know the world and live in it in ways that transverse the limitations existing order.   
Because neither one is sufficient on their own to manifest possible heretical utopian 
worlds of tomorrow, the utopian form always involves a combination of two processes; 
the construction of alternative spaces and relations that embody the kind of cultural 
values that are prioritized alongside direct resistance to dismantle the hegemonic order.  
A single utopian form can influence one or both of these processes to varying degrees 
across space, time, and cultural context.  
The utopian form is how heretics communicate their ideas and live out their 
utopian fantasies alongside others, whether through the process of creating and 
experiencing art such as literature, film, or painting or living alternatively in various 
ways, such as through co-operatives, intentional communities, housing squats, indigenous 
solidarity groups, or education initiatives (Wright 2010)(Holloway 2011)(Goodyear-
Ka'opua 2013).  The fact that these dreams are shared is what makes them so powerful 
and attractive to those whose instincts for freedom and solidarity have not been 
anesthetized by the fascist cultural imaginary and they breathe life back into those who 
have gotten lost in the hegemonic order; those who have become estranged from other 
dreamers and become lost in a nightmare. 
This dimension of the utopian is limited by two primary factors; the hegemonic 
notion of success and the exercise of the law.  Because the hegemonic notion of success 
is equated with maximizing one’s individual capacity to consume and accumulate value, 
it is difficult to find people who are willing to contribute resources and effort towards 
projects that do not serve these immediate ends.  Not to mention the fact that the majority 
are struggling to survive and barely have the resources to provide for themselves, 
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nevertheless build another world.  At the same time, the law prevents civil-society from 
being able to gain access to these resources because they are privately owned and 
protected by the state.  The law also requires that civil-society live a certain way (zoning, 
structural, formal education, and cohabitation laws) and pay taxes, which must occur 
through the exchange of universal value only to be acquired through participation in 
abstract labor and the commodification of the commons.  In other words, artificial 
scarcity and the law that maintains it and shape possibility and create conditions that 
contain the utopian form within the confines of the established order, which makes it 
more difficult to build alternatives because they must meet certain specifications.   
Besides the financial costs, often not available to the most vulnerable of society 
who would most benefit from heretical utopian forms, alternative projects often must be 
filtered through government bureaucracies at various levels that are not structured to 
facilitate them.  For example, building codes, zoning laws, and occupancy, taxes cut 
deeply into the heretical utopian form and often prevent it from becoming whole.  In this 
way, the dominant group suppresses the utopian form and traps its subjects within the 
confines of the existing order, subjecting them to the power of the market and therefore, 
requiring their participation in abstract labor where they can be exploited, taxed, and 
conscripted.   
 
Conclusion 
In this section I described the architecture of the heretical cultural imaginary and 
how its components, cultures of resistance and the radical imagination, effectively 
produce a sense of justice that includes everyone and recognizes difference.  A utopia 
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whose claimants desire social and political justice, imagine alternative ways of knowing 
and being that are incongruent with reproducing the social order, and is manifested in 
material reality in ways that simultaneously pose a challenge to, and are challenged by, 
the hegemonic order.  The heretical cultural imaginary is never universal, static, or 
imposed upon others, but rather it is cultivated through the process of living with other 
people in ways that are distinct from the fascist cultural imaginary and the hegemonic 
social order.  
In chapter 4 I will explore how the utopian form can be used to prioritize utopian 
thought as a framework for justice by emancipating the heretical cultural imaginary from 
the shackles of practicality and hegemonic success that must be worn to reproduce the 
fascist social order; the limits of permissible truth.  This requires studying how both 
values and imaginations transform, both consciously and subconsciously, as well as how 
this knowledge can be applied in a democratic fashion that does not reproduce another 
social order. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EMANCIPATING UTOPIAN POSSIBILITIES 
Transforming Cultural Values and the Political-Economic Imagination 
When it comes to utopian thought, emancipation is about shattering the chains 
that bind humanity to the universal truths ascribed to reality by the status quo, but in 
order to shatter these chains we must possess the proper tools, which are never those that 
are provided by the dominant group: the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s 
house!” (Lorde 2007, p.6).  In other words, one needs to possess a particular aptitude that 
is only offered by the heretical cultural imaginary; a perspective which grants a person 
the capacity to consciously select and privilege the values they wish to embody and to 
imagine the world beyond the fascist assumptions about the nature of a universal material 
realty that are perpetuated by the dominant group.  Because the cultural imaginary is the 
process that results from the dialectical relationship between one’s cultural values and 
political-economic imaginations, changes to one component will affect the other and in 
turn, both are possible vehicles for the emancipation of possibility.  In turn, both of the 
components of the cultural imaginary are not only subject to one another, but to those of 
the people around us: 
 
Imagination allows us to fill in the gaps, to build a mental picture of the world 
that creates us and that we create. For this reason, the imagination is both 
beautiful and dangerous. It is beautiful because it exists at the seam or overlap 
between the individual and society, between the way we are each unique and the 
way we are bound together. In other words, the imagination weaves together the 
  94   
common and the uncommon. The imagination is both a private terrain and a 
shared landscape, or, more accurately, multiple shared landscapes which we 
experience in different ways with different people. Fundamentally, the 
imagination is how we conceive of what and who is valuable; systems of power 
work, in part, by conscripting our imaginations and (mis)infoming our sense of 
value. What we imagine to be valuable affects how we act and react to others, to 
ourselves, to the world. Our actions, in turn, impact and inform our own 
imagination and the imaginations of others. Value shapes the sorts of cooperative 
actions we take, and what we think of as normal, acceptable, reasonable and just 
cooperation. The absence of the radical imagination sees the totalitarian world of 
Walmart as normal and reasonable. (Haiven 2014, loc. 3435-3446) 
 
 
Humans do not imagine the world from an individual or objective view, but rather the 
imagination which is a faculty that organizes our cultural significations into a “shared 
landscape,” to which we look when we make decisions about how to act in the world.  
When one’s cultural significations are organized according to a fascist ideology, which 
privileges certain aspects of human difference over others, the limits of what is 
considered possible are constrained.  In turn, the ways in which one behaves in the world 
will reflect the limitations of both the significations and the ideologies that organize them 
and in effect, normalize them in the cultural imaginary of those who share the experience.  
 
In Culture Moves: Ideas, Activism, and Changing Values (1998), Thomas R. 
Rochon describes how “cultural change occurs when we alter the conceptual categories 
with which we give meaning to reality” (Rochon 1998, p.15).  In this way, cultural 
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change shifts the parameters of the spectrum that contains the hegemonic conception of 
what views are considered valid with regard to a specific social issue.  When a person’s 
cultural values contradict those of the hegemonic order, they disrupt the way the 
imagination is organized and what significations are privileged, which contributes to the 
shifting the limits of what is considered possible.   
Whenever instances of police brutality come to light in the United States, they are 
almost exclusively framed in terms of whether or not the individual is accountable or not.  
At the same time, when someone operating from the heretical cultural imaginary enters 
the conversation, they might question the role of the police entirely, as well as the nature 
of the law that the offender may have allegedly broken. Unfortunately, this perspective is 
suppressed because it is understood as being inconsistent with the fascist cultural 
imaginary, which understands the law as just and police as a natural, necessary, and 
desirable feature of society; a group of people who selflessly serve their communities in 
an unbiased fashion according to the “impartial” application of the law for the betterment 
of their communities.  In turn, any cases of inexcusable police wrongdoing are perceived 
as the result of individual agency rather than structural conditions maintained through the 
existing order.   
The officer that breaks the rules is always the “bad apple” and never the taken for 
granted agent of a fascist order who happened to get caught, which displaces blame from 
the state and places it on the individual so as to preserve the legitimacy of its authority.  
Therefore, if those concerned with social and political justice wish to manifest a world 
that allows for alternative ways of relating to one another, maybe even one that does not 
need police, they must emancipate the heretical cultural imaginary, which occurs through 
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the experience of interacting with other people across space and time in ways that 
embody heretical cultural values and political-economic imaginaries. 
I will begin this discussion by describing the various ways that cultural values 
transform.  For Rochon (1998, p.22), the first step in the diffusion and propagation of 
alternative values is the creation of a critical community, or a small group of people who 
have “developed a sensitivity to some problem, an analysis of the sources of the problem, 
and a prescription for what should be done about the problem.”  These critical 
communities are “composed primarily of scientists, academics, and a variety of social 
analysts and commentators” who have established a relatively similar discourse regarding 
the nature of the problem they have collectively identified and grown concerned about 
(Rochon 1998, p.95).  Once these ideas are appropriated by leaders of social movements, 
they are transformed and the critical communities “fade into the background,” which 
leads us to the second step; the incubation and cultivation of these values through social 
and political movements (Rochon 1998, p.55-57).   
Rochon (1992, p.38) defines a social movement as “any collective action that 
employs protest to further the goal of producing change” and in turn, its “optimal form of 
organization is one that maximizes participation, creating settings for interactions that 
serve to articulate, publicize, and disseminate critiques of existing institutions, practices, 
and values” (Rochon 1998, p.33).  While not all social movements are heretical utopian 
forms, as is the case with fascist movements, all heretical utopian forms contribute to 
social movements.  These social movements have the capacity to transform cultural 
values into those that serve the interests of specific groups, rather than those that seek to 
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instrumentalize their cultural imaginaries and behaviors for the benefit of the dominant 
group. 
Rochon (1998) identifies three ways that cultural values change: value 
conversion, value creation, and value connection.  Value conversion “is the replacement 
of existing cultural values with new ideas on the same topic about what is important, 
equitable, or legitimate” in a particular space. (Rochon 1998, p.54).  In other words, it 
occurs when an explicit set of values for a particular context become insufficient for 
some reason in a particular time and space.  Rochon (1998, p.54) offers the example of 
the end of racial segregation in the United States, which occurred when the logic of racial 
categories and rankings was deemed indefensible and “socially imposed barriers to 
equality of achievement [became] more visible to us because the presumption no longer 
[existed] that differences in achievement [reflected] differences in ability.”  This mode of 
cultural change is usually difficult to accomplish because it involves changing already 
existing values, but it is very important when we consider the degree to which women, 
the poor, and people of color are valued in the United States. 
The second type of value change is value creation, or “the development of new 
ideas, concepts, or categories of analysis that apply to situations that had not previously 
been the subject of explicit cultural values” (Rochon 1998, p.54).  In other words, this 
process occurs in spaces that do not have any set, explicit values for “phenomena were 
simply not taken into account in judging human behavior” previously (Rochon 1998, 
p.55).  For example, the development of agriculture led to the establishment of stationary 
societies where large amounts of people could live within a small proximity with each 
other.  In turn, they had to develop new cultural values that cater to their new 
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environment.  This mode of altering cultural values is inevitable and in turn, very 
susceptible to change.   
The final way that values change is through the process of value connection, or 
“the development of a conceptual link between phenomena previously thought either to 
be unconnected with each other or to be connected in a different way” (Rochon 1998, 
p.54).  This occurs where those seeking to institute new values connect their ideas to 
those of already established values in order to make their argument and as a result are 
often in control of who is involved in the issue (Rochon 1998, p.86).  By connecting state 
funded social programs that serve the most vulnerable members of society (implying they 
are of value) to the massive national deficit and high rates of taxation, corporate-owned 
propaganda agencies in the mass media conceal how public funding is being funneled 
into hands of the wealthy financial elite through various mechanisms such as the war on 
drugs, the petro-military-industrial complex, the prison-industrial complex, the white-
savior-industrial complex (Cole 2012), corporate subsidies, economic plunder, increased 
surveillance and security, and so-called international development programs.  As the 
values and political interests of the poor come to mimic those of the wealthy and 
powerful to the point of their own detriment, their political-economic imaginations are 
constrained and financialized.  At the same time, their behavior and logic becomes 
instrumentalized; a means to end, but never one’s own.   
Now that it is clear how cultural values transform, I can move on to exploring 
how the political-economic imagination can be unbound from fascist ideological 
structures that constrain utopian possibilities.  Once again, the radical imagination is the 
capacity to see the world otherwise; a collective process that exists as the friction 
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between instrumentality and self-determination.  When one embraces the radical 
imagination rather than myths and fear-based imaginaries, the experience thrusts their 
cultural imaginaries into motion, freeing them from their fascist controls that tell them 
“this is how it is and all it can ever be,” compelling the person to push towards self-
determination and allowing them to express who they really are, when they have the 
means to be.  This is exactly why the dominant social order acts incessantly to scandalize 
and suppress the utopian impulse and the imaginings and forms that tend to follow.    
While desires and imaginings can remain private, utopian forms are more difficult 
to conceal and in many cases impossible.  In fact, heretical utopian forms typically do not 
try to hide unless they are trying to avoid being made legible to the status quo as a threat 
to the established order and almost never in terms of the ideas they are attempting to 
normalize. This is because their primary purpose is to embed new ideas, destabilize old 
ones, and transform each of them in the process by fostering widespread participation and 
awareness in the public.   
In the hegemonic social order, heretical utopian forms such as radical social 
movements that emphasize collective solidarity simultaneously pull from and contribute 
to the process of the radical imagination, resulting in “shared landscapes of possibility 
and contestation that confront and contradict the reigning imaginaries of capital and 
power” (Haiven 2014, p.223).  These “shared landscapes are shaped by and also shape 
the imaginations and the actions of their participant individuals” (Haiven 2014, p.4).  In 
other words, when one engages in behaviors or relations that challenge the taken-for-
granted assumptions used to justify the existence of the hegemonic order in the fascist 
cultural imaginary, the spectrum of possibility in one’s political-economic imagination is 
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broadened as they redefine what is truly possible across time, space, and culture in terms 
of how humans relate to one another and the planet.   
The “key to sustaining and building the radical imagination, then, is the 
establishment of alternative spheres of values and radical forms of social cooperation 
where we can reproduce ourselves and our world outside the dictates of the reigning 
paradigm” (Haiven 2014, loc. 3467).  These spaces, such as Foucault’s (1967) 
heterotopias and Wright’s (2010) real utopias, cultivate the radical imagination by 
drawing people together to share experiences that challenge the nature of reality and 
possibility as they know it: to “catch a glimpse, as if from the corner of the eye, our raw 
potential as cooperative beings, unmitigated or unorchestrated by the structures of capital 
and daily life. We glimpse our own unalienated selves” (Haiven 2014, loc. 2451). 
Social movements that emancipate either aspect of the heretical cultural 
imaginary do not necessarily have to explicitly perform the function in order to so, but 
rather “the very fact of participation puts people in new situations and enables them to 
develop previously unsuspected abilities” that challenge the assumptions that make the 
architecture of the fascist cultural imaginary so resilient (Rochon 1998, p.138).  While 
people participate in social movements for all sorts of reasons such as religion, solidarity, 
or even racking up volunteer hours to put on a resume, it is often the case that “alternative 
doing grows out of necessity” where “the functioning of the capitalist market does not 
allow us to survive and we need to find other ways to live, forms of solidarity and 
cooperation” (Holloway 2010, p.3-4).   
Regardless of their origins, experiencing these counterhegemonic utopian forms 
provide us the opportunity to imagine the world otherwise; to fantasize about other ways 
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of knowing and being that prioritize human dignity over the market.  This phenomena is 
especially useful in the context of the fascist cultural imaginary not only because it is so 
effective at blinding its claimants to the possibility of another world, but also because it 
instrumentalizes their behavior so effectively.  Because the fascist cultural imaginary 
compels its claimants to dismiss alternatives as “merely utopian” by containing potential 
futures within the hegemonic spectrum of possibility in which only the established order 
is possible, the cultivation of the cultural imaginary is about “deferring the blink—
keeping eyes pried open—and suspending the process of judgment formation” (Liu 2009, 
loc. 1133).  In other words, it is about considering the alternative before automatically 
dismissing an idea as undesirable, irrelevant, or impractical. 
  Emancipating the heretical cultural imaginary does not always result from direct 
participation in the creation of, or participation in, social movements because such 
behaviors have what Rochon (1998, p.54) refers to as “ripple effects,” where sympathetic 
spectators, members of the group whose interests are being advocated, families and 
friends of activists are affected, either consciously or subconsciously, by a specific social 
movement.  Gaining the awareness that other people are actively fighting to normalize 
alternative values and imaginaries in concrete ways, shatters the limits they have 
embedded in their cultural imaginaries as well; knowledge of the utopian form is itself 
emancipatory.  Because they do not have to experience these values directly in order to 
be affected, all forms of human expression that shatter the hegemony of the existing order 
in a particular space and time play an immense role in the cultivation of the heretical 
cultural imaginary because rather than reproduce commonsense understandings, they 
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thrust the static aspects of cultural imaginaries into motion where the claimants can take 
them seriously. 
Creative utopian forms such as music, visual art, literature, architecture, and 
visual ethnography beg us to reconsider even the most confident and comfortable 
certainties.  When a piece of artwork really moves its viewer and the chains of 
impossibility that have been ascribed by the established order are smashed, it is never 
because of the material form itself, but rather the ideas people manifest in their cultural 
imaginaries as a result of experiencing it.  In this way, the most inspirational art is rarely 
that which comes from pure technical skill, portraying world as it is, but instead it is that 
which most effectively convinces us of the worth of considering the world otherwise.  
The most powerful pieces of art are never decorations to egoize in the here and now, but 
rather they are portals that both compel and authorize us to experience another world.  In 
this way, the utopian form while sometimes aesthetic, is always about heresy and 
rebellion against the limits of space and time: a warping of material reality to reflect a 
specific possibility derived from the link between the body and the imagination: 
We said that the desire to fly produced the airplane.  But people don’t get into 
airplanes because they want to fly; they get into planes because they want to get 
somewhere else faster.  What’s produced the airplane is not so much a desire to 
fly as a rebellion against the tyranny of space and time.  And that’s the process 
that we can never stop, no matter how high our Titovs and Glenns may go. (Frye 
1964, p.30) 
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Art can potentially bypass fascist limitations in the cultural imaginary by 
juxtaposing similar types of relations and scenarios in another time and space where they 
can imagine alternatives.  Where painting is one of the best methods to directly portray 
the visions someone manifests in their imagination, literature, both fiction and non-
fiction, but especially science fiction “gives us an experience that stretches us vertically 
to the heights and depths of what the human mind can conceive” (Frye 1964, p.101) and 
in turn, “literature belongs to the world man constructs, not to the world he sees; to his 
home, not his environment” (Frye 1964, p.27).  When one imagines the same types of 
relations they take for granted in reality in another context, the taken for granted once 
again becomes a specific and conscious reality, regardless of their context to which it is 
applied (Jameson 2004).  This is why free expression is so important and why the types 
of knowledge it produces are suppressed, degraded, and commodified into its most docile 
forms when compared to forms of creativity or innovation that generate value: “Capital, 
since the beginning, says to people, ‘your creativity is valid only within the bounds of 
value production: if you do not produce value, your creativity counts for nothing’” 
(Holloway 2010, p.247).  For this reason, “money goes toward those who create new 
goods and services…” which is “…why there are many paying jobs to be had doing 
things that are complicit in the conversion of natural and social capital into money, and 
few jobs to be had reclaiming the commons and protecting natural and cultural treasures” 
(Eisenstein 2011, p.103). 
When someone experiences heretical utopian forms, they are forced to confront 
their hegemonic assumptions and in turn, the types of instrumental relationships and 
behaviors these beliefs coerce us to participate in.  They examine the types or political-
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economic relationships in which they participate either willingly or unwillingly, as well 
as the values that perpetuate these behaviors; they put themselves in a position to 
confront the fact that “people tend to adjust their beliefs and values so as to make their 
own choices appear better (Huemer 2013, p.113).  Such an approach is necessary because 
when the taken for granted the nature of a system of beliefs still remains it is impossible 
to consciously change it and for this reason, it is more difficult to persuade someone they 
have been deceived than it is to deceive them.   
This dynamic is obvious in organized religion, where the most devout are so 
fearful of divine retribution, that they will not face any ideas that challenge their beliefs, 
even if the reasons for their validity is placed right in front of the person.  This is why 
“great cultivators of imagination—great teachers—will deliberately obscure a crucial part 
of the story,” because without personally drawing out the contradictions between ones 
experiences and the ways they are encouraged to think about them, they will always be 
subject to that which is commonsense; that which maintains order (Liu 2009, loc. 1054).  
For example, if a young woman in an isolated patriarchal society had never experienced 
an alternative world where gender relations were non-hierarchical, not only would they 
lack the capacity to imagine what it might look like, but they may not have ever even 
considered it a possibility.  It would be like trying to imagine what it would look like to 
live in the United States without white supremacy; I have no idea what that would look 
like.  In fact, I have trouble imagining it as possible considering its history and the 
relationships that are necessary to maintain the nation as it is now.  What about a world 
where privilege and social status were only to be gained by contributing to one’s 
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community rather than serving rational self-interest?  What does that look like in a 
society that values science as well as the natural environment? 
In this section I described how each aspect of the heretical cultural imaginary is 
released from its fascist limitations when someone experiences the concrete utopian 
forms produced by people whose cultural imaginaries are only limited according to their 
heterogeneous, dynamic, cultures of resistance and the landscapes produced by the 
radical imagination process, both of which, are constantly evolving processes.  In the next 
section, I will offer examples of these utopian forms and describe how they function as 
such in the hegemonic cultural imaginary of the United States. 
 
Manifesting Heretical Utopian Forms 
 In order to identify concrete examples of the heretical utopian form as it exists in 
the United States, initially I must isolate its seven characteristics, the first of which is that 
the utopian form always seeks to transcend the existing order and shatter the assumptions 
that justify its interlocking webs of power such as the state, religion, and capitalism, 
which can hardly be separated from one another.  In turn, the utopian form empowers 
civil-society and attempts to prioritize its influence over the other two spheres of power; 
the state and the market.  The second characteristic of the heretical utopian form ensures 
that the utopian form avoids the dangerous aspects of utopian thinking by dissecting any 
position of superiority or universality as well as any sense of necessity it be imposed 
upon others; when a utopian form is imposed on others, inevitably leads to failure for its 
incapacity to account for specificity across time, space, and cultural context.  Third, these 
utopian forms are always experimental and in turn, their implications must be easy to 
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reverse in case they result in tragedy.  Fourth, because one’s sense of justice is separate 
from their morality, these utopian forms must be congruent with behaviors they 
understand as morally acceptable if they are to be effective.  The Fifth aspect of the 
heretical utopian form requires that they not be relegated to the future; subjecting their 
fate to the system they are attempting to escape.  The sixth characteristic of the heretical 
utopian form is derived of a cultural imaginary that produces a sense of justice that 
recognizes human difference as such and rejects systems of categories and rankings that 
limit possibility and feed fascist movements.  In the contemporary United States this 
implies that the values and imaginaries a utopian form projects are those of the heretical 
cultural imaginary, which emphasizes the value of the commons, direct democracy, 
mutual aid, concrete labor, and self-determination.  The seventh and final characteristic of 
the heretical utopian form is that it must never be permanent, but rather it must be 
incessantly dynamic and sensitive to change.   
 Now that I have operationalized the characteristics of the heretical utopian form 
they can be deployed in order to explore what types of strategies a heretic might utilize to 
emancipate the cultural imaginary as well as how each of them would actually function in 
relation to the established order.  Wright (2010) identifies three strategies of social 
transformation: Symbiotic, Ruptural, and Interstitial.  Each of these categories have 
unique benefits and problems, but they all contribute to the never ending process of 
manifesting the heretical utopian vision in the heart of the established order.  These are 
visions filled with “heroic victories over existing structures of oppression followed by the 
tragic construction of new forms domination, oppression, and inequality” (Wright 2010, 
p.24).  In this way, they dwell what Haiven (2014, p.130) describes as the space between 
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“not-success” and “not-failure,” that becomes apparent when one understands that “forms 
of social relations are processes, processes of struggle, live antagonisms…” perpetuated 
by people who possess ways of knowing and being that exist ‘in the mode of being 
denied’ (Gunn 1995, p.14). 
The first mode of social transformation is symbiotic transformation, which occurs 
where social movements drive towards “extending and deepening the institutional forms 
of popular social empowerment” in order to enact social change (Wright 2010, p.306).  In 
other words, symbiotic social change takes place through already established structures of 
the state and capital.  Often times, this type of change serves the interest of both civil-
society and the status quo, “a positive class-compromise… …between the associational 
power of the working class and the material interests of capitalists” (Wright 2010, p.338-
339).  For example, a labor union calling for a specific safety regulations to be legally 
required in a workplace might benefit businesses by preventing accidents and reducing 
turnover, while it simultaneously benefits the workers by creating a safer work 
environment.  Because symbiotic transformation always occurs within the limits of the 
existing order, it is never explicitly heretical.  However, the gains that one makes through 
the social order can benefit civil-society in ways that strengthen the other types of 
transformation.  For example, when the state establishes a minimum-wage, workers 
become less exploitable and have to work less in order to survive.  In turn, they have 
more time and resources to dedicate to interstitial and ruptural strategies that always 
occur outside the hegemonic order. 
Advocates of ruptural strategies “envision creating new institutions of social 
empowerment through a sharp break within existing institutions and social structures… 
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…through direct confrontation and political struggles it is possible to create a radical 
disjuncture in institutional structures in which existing institutions are destroyed and new 
ones built in a fairly rapid way (Wright 2010, p.303).  These types of strategies engage in 
a complete rejection of the existing social order through direct action politics, often 
seeking out confrontation with the state and capital.  In many cases, ruptural strategies 
take the form of armed insurrections, as is the case with the Zapatista movement in 
Chiapas, Mexico, the barricading of the Paris Commune in 1871, or the all-female 
Peoples Protection Unit (YPG) that has been fighting for autonomy and gender equality 
in Syrian Kurdistan since 2012.  While these conflicts do fall under the ruptural 
transformation category, it also includes less-fatal types of confrontations, such as those 
that occurred on a fall day in Seattle, Washington in 1999, where through the collective 
efforts of over 40,000 protesters, the anti-globalization movement sabotaged the World 
Trade Organization’s Ministerial Conference.   
What made this particular demonstration fall under the ruptural transformation 
category was the fact that around 200 demonstrators formed a black bloc9 and effectively 
controlled the streets for three days before they were dispersed; freeing protesters being 
arrested, barricading the streets, destroying corporate and state infrastructure, and 
engaging in street fighting with the authorities.  This type of strategy is often framed in 
the media as a group of teenagers looking for a reason to cause destruction, so even 
progressives in the United States often oppose such actions because they are used to 
justify the use of police violence against non-violent protesters who are there to 
                                                 
9 A tactic where protesters cover their faces and form a group with the intention of concealing their 
identities from the authorities.  
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demonstrate within the limits of what is acceptable to the state.  However, black blocs 
represent a complete rejection of the established order and my advice to progressives who 
oppose such tactics are that they should consider the dire condition of the global ecology 
and heed the words of Lauren Olamina, a character from Octavia Butler’s The Parable of 
the Sower (1993, p.7): “A gift of God may sear unready fingers.”10 
 
Rather than seeking confrontation with the forces of the state and capital, 
interstitial transformation occurs where networks of people “seek to build new forms of 
social empowerment in the niches and margins of capitalist society, often where they do 
not seem to pose any immediate threat to dominant classes and elites” (Wright 2010, 
p.305).  This process always occurs outside the state and as independently as possible 
from capitalism because it seeks to create emancipatory alternatives that embody non-
hegemonic or counter-hegemonic values and imaginings.  In this way, interstitial 
transformation is simultaneously utopian and anti-dystopian (anti-anti-utopian); 
concurrently creating counter-hegemonic desires, imaginaries, and forms and hostile 
towards that which attempts to suppress any of these aspects of the utopian.   
Not only does interstitial transformation offer alternatives to abstract labor 
wagedom, but it also seeks to disrupt the reproduction of the social order: “like a complex 
ecological system in which one kind of organism initially gains a foothold in a niche but 
eventually out-competes rivals for food sources and so comes to dominate the wider 
environment.  (Wright 2010, p.307).  Experiments and projects such as “worker and 
consumer co-ops, battered women’s shelters, workers factory councils, intentional 
                                                 
10 Lauren Olamina equates “God” with “change” analogically (Butler 1993). 
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communities and communes, community-based social economy services, civic 
environmental councils, community-controlled land trusts, cross-border equal-exchange 
trade organizations” empower civil-society by attempting to “build a new society in the 
shell of the old (Wright 2010, p.324-325).  To construct another world in the “shell of the 
old,” is to attempt to “prefigure” the future of social relations, subjectivities, and 
behaviors to will a “world that is not yet but could be, exists not-yet as real anticipation in 
the struggles of the past and present” (Holloway 2010, p.170).   
It is important to point out that prefigurative politics is not the same as the 
survivalist or “prepper” movement, where individuals or groups of people prepare for 
various disaster scenarios such as alien invasion, rapture, environmental disaster, or 
foreign military occupation.   These theories shape countless tactics and strategies 
including building fortified bunkers, acquiring martial training, hoarding supplies and 
ammunition, even psychological training for spending long periods of time in 
underground compounds in order to have a leg up on the rest of what remains of the 
species.  However while both heretics and preppers are concerned about the potential 
future and lack faith in the capacity of the established order to protect them, they are very 
still very different because heretics are trying to dismantle structures of illegitimate 
authority through forms of conscious and alternative social reproduction that decentralize 
power and build solidarity to in order to give people the tools necessary to save the world 
from itself, while survivalists are concerned with preserving their privilege in the future 
independently of the interests of others by investing their surplus share of the commons 
in their security on the chance of a final event.  In this way, they choose to privatize the 
preservation of their future in the end of the world rather than try to save it.  The 
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endgame disaster scenario is an artifact of today’s hopeless world; manifested by either 
the hopeless cynic or the paranoid psychopath, both of which, could benefit greatly from 
experiencing and understanding the world as it could otherwise be. 
 
Conclusion 
The heretic seeks to emancipate the commons from the established order, which 
incessantly strives to privatize and commodify every aspect of human life according to 
the logic of market fundamentalism.  As everything around them is increasingly enclosed 
by capital and the state, the heretic is forced to pay for that which they used to get for 
free, which requires that they engage in a “contractual” relationship with a property 
owner to whom they can sell their labor for less than its full value; to submit to 
exploitation and the instrumentalization of their ways of knowing and being.  When 
abstract labor replaces a person’s meaningful activities, they often forget who they are, 
which is why “the signature quality of commons is that they are part of who we are; they 
blur the line between individual and community” (Haiven 2014, loc. 1374).   
The existence of the commons requires that every person have direct democratic 
power in deciding on the “purposes to which the means of production are put and on the 
allocation of the social surplus” (Wright 2010, p.116).  Participation in direct democracy 
provides the people of civil-society with the opportunity to remember who we are and act 
it out, rather than simply serving as someone’s means to an ends or relegating social 
change to the future.  It is for this reason, that those engage in prefigurative politics 
advocate that “if you can embody the change you struggle for, you have already won - 
not by fighting but by becoming” (Holloway 2010, p.45).   
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When heretics refuse to endure indignity in their lives, they become the changes 
they wish to see and produce what John Holloway (2010) as cracks in the established 
order.  These cracks “are the acting-out of a world that does not exist, in the hope that by 
acting it out, we may really breathe it into life” (Holloway 2010, p.37).  Cracks are never 
a means to an ends, but rather “an opening outwards” towards possibility; one that “is 
never entirely closed, even when it is violently suppressed” (Holloway 2010, p.35).  They 
command us to imagine the world otherwise and effectively draw out taken-for-granted 
contradictions between the way we desire the world to be and the way we experience it 
that challenge the legitimacy of the existing order.  This process can form cracks of all 
shapes and sizes, but what is most important is where they connect and overlap, 
contributing to a larger process.  When these cracks intersect through collective 
solidarity, utopian dreams shine through the fissures in the shell of the old world to reveal 
new potentials for freedom and self-determination.  At the same time, the order attempts 
to heal its wounds and divert its subject’s eyes from what lies beyond them; utopian 
possibilities. 
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CONCLUSION  
As I discussed in chapter 1, utopia is connected to hope, which always implies 
that one may not necessarily be in control of a desired outcome in the future.  A person 
never “hopes” for something they know will certainly occur if they desire it to be so.  In 
this way hope and utopia are anxieties imposed upon those who come to know dignity in 
a world without, and possess the courage to embrace it despite the presence of 
overwhelming power; a gift of refusal that tells the people of civil-society that we are 
both worthy and capable of being who we want to be.    When they are heretical, these 
desires (utopian impulse), visions (utopian imaginary), and manifestations (utopian form) 
challenge the assumptions that legitimate the authority that seek to maintain the 
established order. 
In chapter 2, I explored how hopelessness is a symptom of the order’s capacity to 
conscript the cultural imaginary of its subjects and submit them to domination by 
subjecting possible futures to the will of the status quo.  In the United States, this is 
accomplished through the hegemonic fascist cultural imaginary; the process that takes 
place as a result of the dialectical relationship between market values and the 
financialized imagination.  The architecture of the fascist cultural imaginary subjects its 
claimants to the instrumental logic of abstract labor, which renders them faithful to a 
system that negates self-determination and autonomy outside the capitalist order. 
In chapter 3, I explored the heretical cultural imaginary by deploying low theory 
in order to determine what failure looks like in a social order where they hegemonic 
notion of success is maximizing the extent of one’s exploitation by others and of others, 
in conditions where the state and market are left relatively unopposed in their efforts to 
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privatize what was once common.  The heretical cultural imaginary represents the 
process resulting from the dialectical relationship between cultures of resistance and the 
radical imagination, which challenges the hegemonic ways of knowing and being that 
instrumentalize the will of its subjects to reproduce the established order. 
In chapter 4 I tried to imagine what heretical ways of knowing and being look 
like, how they function, and the way they emancipate cultural imaginaries from the limits 
of ascribed instrumentality.  I discovered that the relationship between the utopian 
consciousness and the utopian form is a dialectical one in the sense that when one 
experiences the previously unthinkable and it challenges the legitimacy of the existing 
order, they often desire and imagine utopian worlds; cracks in the chains that bind the 
cultural imaginaries of civil-society.  At the same time, these desires and imaginaries 
compel us to manifest them in reality; cracks in the established order.  Both the utopian 
consciousness and the utopian form are essential to building a more just world, but they 
should be developed in different proportions if they are to be effective because of the 
specific circumstances that exist across time, space, culture, and imagination.   
While some societies possess heretical desires and imaginaries (perhaps spaces 
with enough clean water to fulfill the desires and needs of the people), but they are 
heavily suppressed by the existing order, (where water is privatized and common access 
is restricted), the people should emphasize developing achievable strategies that they can 
use to strengthen their social power (developing or emancipating alternative sources of 
water and even concealing, defending, or liberating them if necessary).  However, if a 
society possesses the resources and capability to build another world, but lacks the desire 
and imaginary, they might go about social change much differently.   
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In cases where utopian consciousness is incessantly suppressed by the status quo, 
it must be cultivated by those concerned with the state of social and political justice.  
Otherwise, it will be forever trapped in a cycle of perpetual instrumentality and 
hopelessness; a world where taken-for-granted forces of the existing order increasingly 
shape our lives as members of civil-society, but we are only permitted to believe that we 
have ourselves to blame for societies problems.  A world where prisons, drone strikes, 
and starvation are taken for granted as unavoidable realities of the human experience. 
Where democracy and justice are equated with procedures that keep us running in circles, 
but never towards justice. 
 The widespread sense of hopelessness and lack of agency that exists in civil-
society, despite the existence of utopian forms, informs me that the United States is in 
desperate need of the heretical cultural imaginary.  If the people are to build a more just 
society and render the old obsolete, it is necessary that we emancipate our cultural values 
and political-economic imaginaries from their hegemonic constraints to make room for 
freedom and possibility.   
I suggest that we take advantage of the fact that the people of the United States 
are addicted to entertainment, social media, and online exploration by making concrete 
examples of alternative worlds appear natural, necessary, and desirable to people who 
have never understood them as such through these various mediums of communication.  
This is the role of all types of artists, including critical scholars, writers, storytellers, film 
makers, and anyone else who have found ways to explicitly remain as themselves, despite 
the overwhelming powers of the state and capital that attempt to instrumentalize their 
utopian desires, imaginaries, and forms.  I believe that expressions of freedom through 
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visual ethnography, documentaries, films, and alternative media, such as Submedia.tv, 
infoshop.org, and anarchistnews.org, have an especially important role to play in this 
process.  Not only because they offer concrete examples of possibilities and demonstrate 
agency, but also because they provide us some level of access into the architecture of the 
cultural imaginary of other heretics.  Both of which, are necessary to address the two 
primary factors that contribute to hopelessness:  the hegemonic assumptions formed in 
the fascist cultural imaginary and the scarcity of spaces where heretics can organize, 
strategize, transform, and emancipate the heretical cultural imaginary.  Spaces where we 
can learn to how to best fail together, rather than taking our chances be ineffective and 
hopeless apart.   
Utopian thought is a source of real political-economic possibility for humans and 
without it we are lost, we are vulnerable, and we are doomed to serve the will of an order 
built with the bones of those who came before.  For this reason, imagining and living in 
the interstices of utopian possibility is never something that one should be ashamed of, 
because when we exist in a fundamentally unjust state of relations, heresy is the only way 
of preserving dignity and treating others with respect.  We must peer into the cracks of 
the counterintuitive and let the light bathe our souls in the potentials of human agency 
because when others see dignity in a space of injustice that is ignored or forgotten, they 
cannot avoid experiencing hope about it in the future.  As the flame of discontent with the 
world builds in their chests as they experience the world in a way that had never been 
understood as possible, they realize the depravity of the one they are in.  As the instinct 
for freedom takes over, that which was always been a utopian dream becomes a 
passionate inclination and that which was impossible, suddenly and unexpectedly, 
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becomes the only option in a world that is so instrumentalized that freedom requires 
heresy.  A world where the self-loathing slave prays to nothing as they cast their ballot, 
while the heretic conjures portals to another time and space teetering on the edge of 
possibility. 
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